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I. INTRODUCTION: DOES RACE MATTER?
Racial gerrymandering... threatens to carry us further from
the goal of a political system in which race no longer mat-
ters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.'
The goal of racial blindness convinced Justice O'Connor and a
1. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
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majority of the United States Supreme Court to subject race-
based congressional reapportionment schemes to strict scrutiny
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.2 Such an analysis
caused the Court to invalidate, most recently in 1996, 3 certain
congressional districts created to ensure that minority voters
held a majority position in those districts-so called "majority-
minority" districts.
Despite the Court's lofty goals, however, the question remains
whether race continues to matter in the political process. The
answer to this question should influence the Court's view of the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause as well as the man-
ner in which it may be applied in political districting decisions.
This Article does not focus on election results. It focuses, in-
stead, on the issue of representation of minority interests in the
Congress-representation that takes the form of policy respon-
siveness.
Only a decade ago, an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court led to legislative redistricting aimed at maximizing the
number of elected officials from minority groups.4 Subsequent
Congresses reflected the results of this redistricting. After the
1992 election, the number of black members of the House of
Representatives rose to thirty-nine, from only seventeen in
1981.' District maps drawn specifically to elect additional mi-
2. See id. at 653-58; Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1901-02 (1996).
3. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1961-62 (1996); Hunt, 116 S. Ct. at 1900-02.
4. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (addressing the issue of redis-
tricting that was used to dilute the impact of black citizens' votes).
5. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2000-01 (Souter, J., dissenting); John R. Crawford,
The New Class: More Diverse, Less Lawyerly, Younger, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 7
(Supp. Nov. 7, 1992); see generally CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTER-
ESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 30 (1993) (reporting
slightly different numbers). Swain reported the following data regarding black mem-
bers of Congress:
Years Congress Number of black
Representatives
1965-1967 89th 6
1967-1969 90th 6
1969-1971 91st 10
1971-1973 92d 13
1973-1975 93d 16
1975-1977 94th 17
1977-1979 95th 17
1997] 1731
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nority members made it possible for thirteen new blacks and six
new Hispanics to win election to the House in 1992.' Thirty-six
of the thirty-nine black members elected in 1992 were elected
from majority-minority districts, whereas only three were elected
from majority-white districts.
A decade after the Thornburg decision, however, the Court
views race-based districting differently.' Yet the Court's view of
the equal protection challenge still is evolving.9 This Article ad-
dresses that evolution. Depending in part on future federal and
state court equal protection decisions, gains achieved through
race-based redistricting may be eliminated." The 1996 election
1979-1981 96th 16
1981-1983 97th 18
1983-1985 98th 20
1985-1987 99th 20
1987-1989 100th 22
1989-1991 101st 23
1991-1993 102d 25
Id.
6. See Crawford, supra note 5, at 7.
7. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1992-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 1962-63 (applying strict scrutiny to redistricting along racial lines
and holding that the states' desire to remedy past discrimination did not justify such
redistricting); Hunt, 116 S. Ct. at 1904-06 (holding that race-based redistricting did
not satisfy strict scrutiny when its purpose was to avoid vote dilution claims).
9. For example, the Court assumed, but did not decide, that compliance with the
Voting Rights Act constitutes a compelling state interest. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at
1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. See Linda Greenhouse, High Court Voids Race-Based Plans for Redistricting,
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996, at Al (explaining that the result may "be the 'bleaching
of Congress' as well as state and local legislative bodies"). In late September 1996, a
three judge panel ruled that nine South Carolina legislative districts were unconsti-
tutional. See Nine Legislative Districts Ruled Unconstitutional by Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 1996, at A19. This decision was the first order to redraw state legislative
districts since the United States Supreme Court's June 1996 opinions that threw out
race-based congressional districts in Texas and North Carolina. See id.
The November 1996 elections did not support predictions of a loss of black or
Hispanic representatives due to redistricting. See Juliana Gruenwald, Incumbents
Survive Redistricting, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY REP. 3229 (1996). Congressional districts
were redrawn in Texas, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana during 1996. See id. In Lou-
isiana, black Congressman Cleo Fields decided not to seek a third term after the
redistricting. See id. In Texas, Florida, and Georgia, all incumbents who had repre-
sented the redrawn majority-minority districts were re-elected. See id. Their success,
however, might be due to the power of incumbency. Penda Hair of the NAACP Le-
gal Defense Fund noted one example: "If Cynthia McKinney [of Georgia, one of the
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results do not soothe this concern. Although black incumbents
were re-elected, racially polarized voting continued to exist.1'
What is lost? If race does not matter, as a means of ensuring
that minority interests are represented in Congress, 2 then the
Court's decision to give primacy to race-blind aspirations may be
acceptable. If race does matter, however, then that conclusion
should influence the manner in which the Court applies the
Equal Protection Clause to future challenges to legislative dis-
tricts.
The significance of the research results contained in this Arti-
cle extends beyond equal protection issues. Current public de-
bate is absorbed with issues, such as welfare reform, immigra-
tion reform, minimum wage increase, and health care protection
for the uninsured, that have a significant effect on minority
re-elected black Representatives] were to retire, I'm not confident another African
American could win in that district." David G. Savage, Despite Redistricting Dispute,
Black Lawmakers Win Reelection, L.A TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1996, at A10, All.
11. In the newly-drawn district in Georgia in which Cynthia McKinney was re-
elected, Representative McKinney won more than 90% of the black vote and an es-
timated 31% of the white vote. In the other newly-drawn district in Georgia in
which Sanford Bishop was re-elected, he won more than 90% of the black vote and
an estimated 36% of the white vote. See Kevin Sack, Victory of 5 Redistricted Blacks
Recast Gerrymandering Dispute, N.Y. TIES, Nov. 23, 1996, at Al. This racial polar-
ization is as extreme as that which had caused the Court in 1986 to support a
finding of violation of the Voting Rights Act due to vote dilution. See Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 54-82 (1986) (analyzing racially polarized voting in state legis-
lative races in North Carolina).
12. Swain provides evidence, gathered through surveys, of the so-called "objective"
interest of blacks, as well as blacks' "subjective" interests. See SWAIN, supra note 5,
at 7-11. Blacks tend to favor redistributive programs more than whites, and this
constitutes one of the most important differences between the two races. See id. at
10-11.
The Hispanic population is a more ideologically diverse group. See RODOLFO 0.
DE LA GARZA ET AL., LATINO VoIcEs: MEXICAN, PUERTO RIcAN & CUBAN PERSPEC-
TIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 83-84 (1992) (noting that the percentage of survey re-
spondents evaluating themselves as slightly to very conservative were 36% of the
Mexican respondents, 39% of the Anglos, 47% of the Puerto Ricans, and 55% of the
Cubans). Notably, however, the socioeconomic status of Hispanic groups is lower
than blacks' on several indicators. See RODNEY E. HERO, LATINOS AND THE U.S. PO-
LITICAL SYSTEM 52-54 (1992). As a result of this lower average socioeconomic status,
the Hispanic population generally Would benefit from redistributive programs and, of
course, from civil rights initiatives. Surveys concerning the government's role in pro-
viding jobs, housing and a minimum income to those in need found that Hispanics,
like blacks, favor more government involvement than Anglos. See DE LA GARZA ET
AL., supra at 85-86 (presenting the results of the Latino National Political Survey).
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groups as well as other groups without a powerful, direct lobby-
ing voice." Fundamental policy divisions that impede progress
often influence the public policy debate.'4 The initial impression
is one of elected officials providing meaningful representation to
minorities, yet failing to pass meaningful legislation because of
policy deadlock.
We must look below the surface, however. We must search for
"legislative heart"--that is, whether elected officials truly feel
compassion for the needs of particular minorities and are com-
mitted to finding some way to address these needs. When we
examine legislative heart, we may, at times, uncover a "legisla-
tive mask" that develops when the words spoken by legislators
provide an explanation for inaction or deadlock, but actually
mask a lack of commitment.
Part II of this Article examines both the methodology and re-
sults of prior case studies that have attempted to measure repre-
sentation. These studies are evaluated in light of chaos theory.
Chaos theory highlights the need for additional research-the
need for more qualitative research, in contrast to past reliance
on quantitative research (e.g., roll-call votes). Based on this eval-
uation, a new approach to the study of representation is present-
ed, one seeking to unmask legislative heart. Part III of this Arti-
cle is a case study of legislative heart and minority interests at
the federal level. It is a study of fair lending reforms from 1968
to 1996, reforms aimed at combating racial and ethnic dis-
crimination against individuals and entire urban neighborhoods.
In Part III, chaos theory's concept of phase transitions is devel-
oped in the legislative arena. The result is an additional expla-
nation for the continued need for race-based districts.
This study concludes that Congress collectively demonstrates
weak legislative heart toward minority needs and interests-i.e.,
a weak desire and commitment to address these issues. Individ-
13. See, e.g., Sara Diamond, Right-Wing Politics and the Anti-Immigration Cause, 23
SOC. JUST. 154 (1996); Guy Gugliotta, Fireworks Over Welfare Fizzle on Floor of
House: GOP Fails To Rise to Baiting by Democrats, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at
A14.
14. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Frustrated Lott Thwarted in Attempt To Break Senate's
'Slow-Rolling' Gridlock, WASH. POST, July 12, 1996, at A15; Gugliotta, supra note 13,
at A14.
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ual members of Congress demonstrate varying levels of desire
and -commitment, including strong legislative heart on the part
of some individual white members. Nevertheless, black and His-
panic members of Congress demonstrate a stronger desire and a
more consistent commitment to address minority needs and in-
terests than white members. The difference is one of degree,
with a substantial degree of difference from Southern white
Democratic members, as well as a noticeable degree of difference
from Northern white Democratic members.
In the past, the expression of the legislative heart of black
and Hispanic members was constrained by the relatively small
number of black and Hispanic members. The evidence finally
points to achievement of a critical mass after the 1992 elections
and race-based redistricting and a phase transition, leading to a
more recognizable minority voice in the legislature.
II. LEGISLATIVE HEART AND REPRESENTATION OF MINORITY
INTERESTS
Professors Eulau and Karps have defined four components of
representation: service responsiveness, allocation responsive-
ness, policy responsiveness, and symbolic responsiveness.15 Ear-
lier studies found that race matters, not only for symbolic repre-
sentation but also for service responsiveness.16 This Article fo-
cuses on policy responsiveness. Professor Pitkin provides a use-
ful and frequently cited definition of the policy responsiveness
component of representation:
[R]epresent[ation] here means acting in the interest of the
15. See Heinz Eulau & Paul D. Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying
Components of Responsiveness, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 233, 241 (1977).
16. Swain, for example, discusses both symbolic representation and service re-
sponsiveness. See SWAIN, supra note 5, at 211-20. Regarding the former, she writes
that "[t]he presence of black representatives in Congress, regardless of their political
party, fulfills a host of psychological needs that are no less important for being in-
tangible." Id. at 217. Regarding the latter, she reports: "Whenever a black represen-
tative is elected, he or she is likely to be contacted by blacks throughout the region
for assistance. This might be expected, in view of Sidney Verba and Norman Nie's
findings that African Americans tend to be reluctant to contact white public offi-
cials." Id. at 219 (citing SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NiE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERI-
CA= POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972)).
173519971
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1729
represented, in a. manner responsive to them. The represen-
tative must act independently; his action must involve discre-
tion and judgment; he must be the one who acts.... And,
despite the resulting potential for conflict between represen-
tative and represented about what is to be done, that conflict
must not normally take place. The representative must act in
such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an expla-
nation is called for.'
This Article develops the concept of legislative heart as a mea-
sure of policy responsiveness. In the context of legislative heart,
this Article focuses Pitkin's definition on a demand that elected
representatives desire to act, and are committed to act, in a
manner responsive to the needs of those whom they represent.
Two types of studies have been conducted: studies of the num-
ber and resources of lobbying groups, including public interest
lobbyists; and studies of the responsiveness of Congress as a
body-and of black, Hispanic and white (non-Hispanic) members
of Congress-to the interests of minority group members. These
studies are discussed in Parts II.A and II.B infra.
A. Direct Versus Representative Legislative Voice
Empirical studies have concluded that two groups are repre-
sented poorly among organized interest groups: the less-advan-
taged and the proponents of broad public policy initiatives. 8 Pro-
fessors Schlozman and Tierney found:
In spite of all the newborn organizations representing the
interests of diffuse publics, minorities, poor people, the elder-
ly and other disadvantaged groups, business actually is a
more dominating presence in Washington now than it was
two decades ago. Considering all organizations having repre-
sentation in Washington, the proportion representing the in-
17. HANNA FENICHEL PrrTI, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967).
18. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 58-87 (1986) (reporting results of a study of Washington polit-
ical organizations and representatives conducted between October 1981 and May
1982); see generally E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF
(1935) (presenting a study of organized Washington interest groups in the 1930s).
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terests of business rose from 57 percent to 72 percent since
1960. The proportion of citizens' groups decreased from 9 per-
cent to 5 percent of all organizations and the proportion rep-
resenting labor plummeted from 11 percent to 2 percent.
•.. To summarize, a very large share of the civil rights
and social welfare organizations and of the groups represent-
ing women, the elderly, and the handicapped are young, hav-
ing been established since 1960. However, there are still so
few of them compared with other kinds of organizations that,
even though their numbers have grown substantially, they do
not form a more significant component in the pressure com-
munity.1
9
Douglas Imig reached a similar conclusion in his study of the
political voice of those who advocate on behalf of the poor.20
Imig concluded:
Poor people and their supporters attempted to influence
the policy-making process in the United States in the 1980s
both directly through social-movement mobilization and indi-
rectly through interest-group activity. Their demands, howev-
er, were often muted and inconsistent ....
... [Aidvocates for the poor... generated little consistent
political response, either through widespread interest-group
or social-movement activity. Not only do the resources neces-
19. SCHLOZhAN & TIERNEY, supra note 18, at 77-78," 81. Such groups also have
fewer financial resources available with which to pursue their interests. See id. at
117-19.
In an earlier survey of national public interest groups, Jeffrey Berry made a
number of findings that reveal the limitations faced by such groups. See JEFFREY M.
BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE 46-55 (1977). The Internal Revenue Code limits
the ability of groups claiming tax-exempt status to advocate for the adoption or re-
jection of legislation. See id. at 46-48. In Berry's study, such groups possessed a
wide range of financial assets, and had annual budgets that ranged from less than
$100,000 (25% of the groups studied) to more than $1,000,000 (19% of the groups
studied). See id. at 60. Finally, public interest lobbyists generally have a low level of
experience in their present work, with 65% of the activists studied having had two
years' experience or less. See id. at 87.
20. See DOUGLAS R. IMG, POVERTY AND POWER. THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
OF POOR AmERICANS (1996). Imig studied advocacy efforts during the 1980s and
1990s. See id. at ix.
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sary for political action remain difficult for the poor to gener-
ate, but the allies that had come to their support at other
times were absent.21
As a result, minorities and other groups with weak direct in-
fluence must rely primarily on elected officials to provide them a
legislative voice. Both pluralist and public choice theorists have
assumed that elected officials would provide such a legislative
voice.
Bentley2  and Truman," for example, presented the
pluralist assumption that the legislature itself would provide a
representative voice to all group interests.' Public choice theo-
rists provided explanations for this assumed representative
voice. First, many public choice theorists accept the proposition
that, although self-interest is the dominant motive, legislators
act not only out of self-interest, but also from ideological motiva-
tions.25 Second, legislator "interest" has been defined broadly as
encompassing the interests of voting supporters as well as con-
tributors.26 Moreover, some have suggested that unorganized
voters with distinct interests influence a legislator's decisions
even if they are not direct supporters.27 Third, some public
21. Id. at 89.
22. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (Transaction Publishers
1995) (1908).
23. DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1971).
24. See BENTLEY, supra note 22, at 360-81; TRUMAN, supra note 23, at 501-24.
25. See Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The
Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 181 (1988) (noting that self-interest is
a significant but not exclusive motive for legislative action); Michael E. DeBow &
Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to
Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993, 999 (1988) (suggesting that "ideological in-
fluence in congressional voting is greatest when the political cost of voting ideologi-
cally is lowest"); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Log-
rolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 (1979) (identifying three
potential explanations for representatives' votes on a particular bill: the economic in-
terest of constituents, logrolling, and ideological support for the bill); Sam Peltzman,
Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting, 27 J.L. & ECON. 181, 210 (1984) (stat-
ing that an economic motive is dominant when constituent interest is factored into
the equation, although ideology plays a prominent role on social policy issues).
26. See Peltzman, supra note 25, at 184-92.
27. See id. at 195-97. A study of Senate votes in the 96th Congress led Peltzman
to imply that the interests of both supporting and opposing voters are reflected in
1738
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choice theorists have introduced the concept of the legislator as
a "political entrepreneur."' Arguably, the positions advocated
by such an entrepreneur can reflect the interests of unorganized,
nonvocal groups.
These theoretical conclusions regarding representative legisla-
tive voice rarely have been tested.29 This Article tests the repre-
sentative legislative voice hypothesis. It explores not merely out-
comes,30 as a surrogate measure of legislative voice, but a
broader spectrum of factors.
B. Members' Policy Responsiveness: Existing Studies
Studies conducted at the local level have linked the election of
minority representatives to policy gains for minority groups.3'
legislator votes. See id. at 197-206.
28. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory
of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46 (1988) (suggesting legislative com-
promise as a way to maximize political support from various interest groups); Fred
S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987) (discussing the role of politicians as inde-
pendent actors making their own demands on private parties).
29. One exception is Robert Dahl's case-study of urban redevelopment efforts and
public education issues, among other issues confronting the City of New Haven, Con-
necticut. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN
CITY (1961). He found that public officials-the professional politicians-were the
most influential group in initiating proposals that were later adopted, and in block-
ing the proposals of others. See id. at 305-10.
30. As to outcomes, public choice theorists do not draw sanguine conclusions re-
garding the interests of silent minorities. George Stigler's theory led to the conclu-
sion that relatively small but powerful groups can obtain regulation for their benefit.
See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. SCI. 3, 4-10 (1971); see also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regula-
tion, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 343-44 (1974) (suggesting that regulation
is enacted as product of coalitions among industry groups, at the expense of unorga-
nized, mostly consumer, groups).
31. Kathryn Yatrakis concluded that a black mayor brought significant policy ben-
efits to Newark, New Jersey's black community. See KATHRYN B. YATRAKIS, ELEc-
TORAL DEMANDS AND POLITICAL BENEFITS: MINORITY AS MAJORIrY: A CASE STUDY OF
Two MAYORAL ELECTIONS IN NEW JERSEY: 1970, 1974, at 315-18 (photo reprint
1989) (1981). In a study of 10 cities in California, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb
found that the presence of minorities on local councils led to the creation of police
review boards, the increased use of minority contractors, and a general increase in
programs oriented toward minorities. See RUFUS P. BROWNING ET AL., PROTEST IS
NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN
POLITICS 141-51 (1984); see also WILLIAM R. KEECH, THE IMPACT OF NEGRO VOTING
58-79 (1968) (finding that black political participation affected the distribution of ser-
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At the congressional level, studies have focused not on specific
policy gains, but on the voting records of black, Hispanic and
other members of Congress.32 Examined below are the recent
studies of the policy responsiveness of Congress and members of
Congress.
Hero and Tolbert studied the Hispanic population and the
substantive representation of Hispanic interests in the House.33
Their study targeted votes during the 100th Congress (1987-
1988) on issues of concern to Hispanic leaders, as determined by
the Southwest Voter Research Institute (SWVRI)."4 They con-
cluded that:
Latino representatives score 10 points higher on the SWVRI
measure than non-Latinos. This level of difference is fairly
close to Welch and Hibbing's finding that Hispanic represen-
tatives have "voting records... nearly 13 points [on scale of
0 to 1001 less conservative [or more liberal] than a non-His-
panic representative."3 5
They also concluded, however, that the difference was not statis-
tically significant."
vices in Durham, North Carolina and Tuskegee, Alabama).
32. See, e.g., Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize
Substantive Black Representation in Congress? 90 AM. POL. SC. REv. 794, 799-801
tbl. 2 (1996). Cameron used the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) index
for the 103d Congress as his primary source of data. See id. at 799. The LCCR in-
dex is compiled from voting records on 14 bills that were considered to be important
to minority interests. See id.
33. See Rodney E. Hero & Caroline J. Tolbert, Latinos and Substantive Represen-
tation in the U.S. House of Representatives: Direct, Indirect, or Nonexistent?, 39 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 640 (1995).
34. See id. at 640. "SWVRI scores represent 'the extent to which votes [by Mem-
bers of Congress] coincide with Hispanic state legislators' views on the issues.'" Id.
at 641 (citing Southwest Voter Research Institute, The 100th Congress: How They
Voted on Issues of Concern to Latino Leaders, 3 SoUTHvEST VOTER REs. NOTES 1
(1989).
35. Id. at 643 (alteration in original). The Welch and Hibbing study focused on
the 93d through 96th Congresses (1972-1980) and relied on an analysis of conserva-
tive coalition voting scores. See Susan Welch & John R. Hibbing, Hispanic Represen-
tation in the U.S. Congress, 65 SOC. SCI. Q. 328, 330 (1984), reprinted in LATINOS
AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 291-99 (F. Chris Garcia ed., 1988).
36. "In the Welch and Hibbing study... Hispanic representatives' scores were
different from non-Hispanics at statistically significant levels; here they are not."
Hero & Tolbert, supra note 33, at 643.
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Turning to the substantive representation provided by all
House members, Hero and Tolbert found that House representa-
tion of Hispanic interests ranged from limited to nonexistent.37
Their research focused on the effect of variations in the number
of Hispanic constituents on members' votes.8 They did find,
however, that Congress as a whole had enacted legislation
deemed salient to Latinos, providing some evidence of possible
collective representation. 9
Hero and Tolbert's analysis of representation through correla-
tions between votes and the size of a legislator's Hispanic con-
stituency does not address the nature and strength of commit-
ment to minority interests, commitment that emerges in the give
and take of committee and floor deliberations. The issue of legis-
lative commitment not reflected in final votes, and its implica-
tions regarding collective representation, is explored further in
this Article."
Overby and Cosgrove studied the behavior of individual white
incumbents following the 1992 legislative redistricting and sub-
sequent elections.4 They concluded that white incumbents who
lost black constituents became less sensitive to the concerns of
African-Americans.42 By implication, this finding shows a re-
37. See id. at 647.
38. See id. at 648-49.
39. Tolbert and Hero noted:
On the other hand, the roll-call votes deemed to be most important to
Latinos were all decided consistent with Latino preferences.... The
finding that Congress may substantively represent Latinos, albeit only
collectively, should not be overlooked. This study is the first to find evi-
dence of indirect substantive representation regarding Latinos. This find-
ing is important both theoretically and normatively. At the same time,
whether this collective-partisan representation "compensates" fully or part-
ly for the essential absence of direct substantive representation is itself a
theoretical and normative issue that deserves future attention.
Id. at 648-49.
40. The portion of Hero and Tolbert's study that correlates voting records to the
preferences of Hispanic leaders does reveal a sizable difference in voting scores be-
tween Hispanic and non-Hispanic members. See id. at 643-44. Yet, other studies are
divided on the statistical significance of the difference.
41. L. Marvin Overby & Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Unintended Consequences? Racial
Redistricting and the Representation of Minority Interests, 58 J. POL. 540 (1996).
42. See id. at 547-48.
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sponsiveness to constituents, just as Peltzman had opined.43
Overby and Cosgrove found, however, that district racial compo-
sition did not have much appreciable impact on Republican vot-
ing behavior," and "[tihe positive and robust relationship be-
tween black constituency size and voting behavior exist[ed] only
for Democrats in the South."" Their explanation for this result
was based on the heavy reliance that southern Democrats place
on biracial electoral coalitions, sensitizing them to the size of
their minority constituencies." Overby and Cosgrove thus
found evidence of a constituency policy responsiveness that per-
haps is subordinated to party preferences. One consequence of
the Overby-Cosgrove finding may be a trade-off between sym-
bolic representation and policy representation in the Congress as
a whole.4" Majority-minority districts drawn to help elect mi-
nority representatives may limit the impact of the minority
community in surrounding areas.49 This is an issue requiring
further study. It is not, however, the focus of this Article. This
Article does, however, find a phase transition due to race-based
redistricting that increases the legislative voice of all minority
members. This may at least set-off the effects documented by
Overby and Cosgrove, and perhaps have an even greater effect.
The research design of the Overby-Cosgrove study relies on
roll-call voting scores, namely returning white, incumbent House
members' 1993 rating by the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political
Education (COPE).50 The Hero and Tolbert study also relied on
roll-call voting scores, tabulated by SWVRI.5" Voting record rat-
ings have been criticized as a measure of policy representation.
43. See Peltzman, supra note 25, at 210.
44. See Overby & Cosgrove, supra note 41, at 546.
45. Id. at 547.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 547-48. The authors describe the Republican party as being less
sensitive to civil rights issues since the 1960s than the Democratic party has been.
See id. at 540. Swain reached the same conclusion. See SWAIN, supra note 5, at 15.
Of course, the party affiliation of individual members may reflect their ideological
predisposition on issues, including those in which minority groups have a special
interest.
48. See Overby & Cosgrove, supra note 41, at 549.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 542.
51. See Hero & Tolbert, supra note 33, at 640.
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Among these criticisms is the concern that they reflect strategic,
as well as policy, goals.52 Additionally, the votes can be a func-
tion of many influences, including a representative's party, con-
stituency, and ideology.53 Finally, all the varied bills comprising
a representative's voting record rating may not reflect policies
that actually help minority communities.'
My reluctance to rely solely on voting record ratings is based
on a deeper concern. Such ratings do not reveal the advocacy ef-
forts, if any, of particular representatives in committee and on
the floor, including the legislation or amendments that they pro-
pose. Policy responsiveness does not consist solely of roll-call
votes. It includes actions that shape the policy agenda in a man-
ner favorable to minority interests, such as bills proposed, ac-
tions in committee hearings, committee lobbying, and other ef-
forts to bring issues to the floor. It also includes shaping the de-
tails of proposed legislation, through methods such as proposing
amendments. Finally, it includes blocking proposals that are
adverse to the interests of minority groups, by ensuring that
bills are not reported out of committee, or ensuring that amend-
ments are blocked or defeated. In short, roll-call votes alone do
not adequately measure the legislative heart of an individual
legislator-the strength of a member's desire and commitment to
address the needs of minority constituents.
A third, recent study of the policy responsiveness of individual
members of Congress to minority interests was conducted by
Carol Swain.55 Swain's study had four components: (a) inter-
views with twenty-seven members and their staffs; (b) observa-
tions in the field; (c) historical analysis, consisting of news clip-
52. See id. at 642 n.4; Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Mon-
eyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 797, 801 (1990).
53. See, e.g. Morris P. Fiorina, Comments, in COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING 46, 50
(Clifford S. Russell ed., 1979).
54. See Cameron et al., supra note 32, at 799-800. Cameron, Epstein, and
O'Halloran defend the LCCR scores as "a reasonable measure of substantive minority
interests." Id. at 800; see also SWAIN, supra note 5, at 14 (describing the author's
alternative rating scales, which exclude some of the items on the COPE and LCCR
scales, although the author concludes that the LCCR and COPE scores "work quite
well for measuring a representative's support for public policies preferred by blacks").
55. See SWAIN, supra note 5.
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pings, constituency mailings, published interviews, and position
papers; and (d) roll-call data analysis for the 100th Congress
(1987-1989).56 The first three components extended through the
spring of 1992."7 In other words, all the data was compiled pri-
or to the legislative redistricting reflected in the 1992 elections.
Swain's main conclusion is that "[r]edrawing boundaries to
create additional districts with large black majorities... ap-
pears not to be the most effective way to increase the represen-
tation of black interests."58 After 1990, no white representative
represented any majority-black congressional districts and 1990
census data initially revealed few areas where new majority-mi-
nority districts could be drawn.59 In addition, Swain concluded
that "white representatives are an underutilized and perhaps
underappreciated alternative source of support for many of the
issues that are of greatest interest to African Americans. The
representation of black interests depends on more than the
shared skin color of the representative and the electorate. " '°
It may be desirable, as Swain suggests, not to use the sixty-
five percent minimum minority population as a standard for
forming race-based districts.6' A lower percentage of minority
population within districts might better maximize the number of
minority members of Congress.62 Whatever the figure em-
56. See id. at x, 227-31.
57. See id. at x.
58. Id. at ix.
59. See id. at 3. Swain notes some experts' suggestions that blacks and Hispanics
might find 12 to 15 new majority-minority districts after the 1990s redistricting, but
beyond that, these groups "can expect severe limitations on what can be achieved by
relying on creation of black majority districts .... " Id. at 200.
60. Id. at ix-x.
61. See id. at 210.
62. Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran have made this argument:
There are important differences across regions, perhaps best summarized
by the concentration level of BVAP [black voting age population] required
to achieve a 50% probability that the elected representative is a black
Democrat . . . . [I]n the South the required level of BVAP is 40.3%; in
the Northwest, 47.3%; in the Northeast only 28.3%. These figures carry a
number of important implications. It is rarely necessary for minority vot-
ers to be a clear majority within a district to have a good chance of
electing a minority representative, and the 65% rule enforced by the
courts certainly seems excessive. By the same token, black candidates
seem to have a fair chance of winning election, even in districts with a
white majority (so-called minority-minority districts).
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ployed, my critique focuses on the unwillingness of the United
States Supreme Court to protect some districts that were creat-
ed to serve the goal of maximizing minority representation, by
questioning whether a compelling state interest is served.
Swain's conclusion was similar to Overby and Cosgrove's on
the issue of party affiliation and responsiveness. She found that
Republicans are less responsive to black interests than are Dem-
ocrats, but "[b]lack representatives are ... not the only source of
black representation in Congress-white Democrats also appear
to represent blacks well." ' s One dissimilarity between Swain's
conclusions and the findings of Overby and Cosgrove is that
Swain found that almost all white Democrats supported black
interests regardless of the percentage of blacks in their dis-
tricts.
64
Despite these broad conclusions, the Swain study actually re-
veals a great deal of variation in policy responsiveness. One
variation was between the roll-call voting records of white ver-
sus black representatives, according to the white represent-
ative's region. Black representatives were clearly the most re-
sponsive to minority interests.65 White, Northern Democrats
were the next most responsive, and white Southern Democrats
were third in line.' Swain also drew the conclusion, however,
Cameron et al., supra note 32, at 804.
Swain made a similar argument, although she continued to assert that it would
be possible to achieve increased black representation from majority-white districts.
See SWAIN, supra note 5, at 207-09; see also id. at 234-35 app. C (comparing LCCR
and COPE voting record ratings of black members representing black districts, heter-
ogeneous districts, and majority-white districts).
63. SWAIN, supra note 5, at 19. As more black-majority districts are created, the
remaining white-majority districts are more likely to elect Republicans. See id. at 205.
64. See id at 17.
65. See id at 234-35 app. C (reporting that COPE ratings for the 100th Congress
averaged 99.7 in historically black districts, 95.3 in newly black districts, 100 in het-
erogeneous districts, and 98.9 in majority-white districts; LCCR ratings averaged 89,
96.5, 88.8 and 97.7 in these respective districts).
66. Swain reported the following statistics regarding white representatives in the
100th Congress:
COPE Rating LCCR Rating
Northern Democrats 92.7 90.3
Southern Democrats 80.2 72.7
Northern Republicans 37.5 43.1
Southern Republicans 14.6 13.1
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that "in a multivariate regression analysis that includes the race
of the representative as one of the independent variables, race is
statistically insignificant . . . ." This conclusion has been criti-
cized in a more recent study by Michael Cobb and Jeffrey
Jenkins.68 Cobb and Jenkins concluded that black representa-
tives "have a significant and large impact on the dependent vari-
able [LCCR voting record scores].... [Bilack representatives
score nearly 13 LCCR percentage points higher than white rep-
resentatives, holding the other variables constant."69 These con-
trasting findings mirror those in studies of Hispanic
representatives' voting scores during different sessions of Con-
gress.
70
At a minimum, one can say that some studies of voting scores
have concluded that race does matter. In evaluating these stud-
ies, one must not forget that many congressional districts sub-
ject to challenge under the United States Supreme Court's re-
cent redistricting decisions are located in the South. The differ-
ence in consistency and strength of commitment, as reflected by
voting record ratings, is quite large between Southern white
Democrats and Southern black Democrats.7'
Swain's conclusions regarding policy responsiveness relied on
roll-call data, although not limited to COPE ratings.72 They are
thus useful, but subject to many of the same limitations dis-
See id. at 57 tbl.3.3.
67. Id. at 212.
68. Michael D. Cobb & Jeffrey A. Jenkins, Who Represents Black Interests in Con-
gress?: Sponsoring and Voting for Legislation Beneficial to Black Constituents, Paper
presented at 1996 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Apr. 18-20,
1996, at 4-5 (on file with author). Cobb and Jenkins's study is of the 103d Congress;
Swain's study was of the 100th Congress. Nonetheless, Cobb & Jenkins do compare
their results to Swain's and critique Swain's conclusions.
69. Id. at 12. Cobb and Jenkins further state: "This finding is not altered when
the sample is reduced to the sub-set of Democrats. In this model, black representa-
tives are estimated to earn, on average, a LCCR rating of over 21 points more than
their white colleagues." Id. at 23 n.7.
70. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
71. See SWAIN, supra note 5, at 57 tbl.3.3. Swain concludes that "[gliven their con-
straints, southern white representatives of districts with substantial black minorities
do a credible job of representing blacks." Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
72. See id. at 14. Swain also used LCCR ratings, as well as two other ratings
systems that she devised, to measure civil rights responsiveness and redistributive
policy responsiveness. See id. at 14-15.
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cussed above. 3 This Article presses the point that conclusions
regarding policy responsiveness must not be based exclusively or
almost exclusively on roll-call data.
Although not the main focus of her study, Swain did draw
conclusions about the advocacy efforts of individual members.
Her aim was to test whether blacks can obtain additional legis-
lative voice from white members of Congress. Swain's research
revealed that strength of advocacy is subject to great variations.
Some black representatives have been extremely vocal and ac-
tive in advocating the interests of minority group members in
the legislative policy process, whereas others have been more
restrained followers of party positions. '4
Similar variations exist among white representatives of black
districts, regardless of whether the district contains a majority
or a substantial (thirty-five percent or more) minority of blacks.
Enormous variation has existed in the responsiveness of various
representatives of the same district. For example, in the sixth
district of South Carolina:
In less than a decade, blacks in the sixth district went from
little representation under MacMillan to meaningful repre-
sentation with Jenrette, and then back to little representa-
tion under Napier. That this traditionally Democratic district
elected the conservative Napier is understandable, given that
the 59 percent white district also voted Republican in the
presidential elections of 1972, 1984, and 1988, and that Jim-
my Carter, a son of the South, barely carried it in 1980....
In 1982 blacks gained meaningful representation again when
Robin Tallon was elected. 5
73. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54. But see supra note 54 (citing au-
thors who defend use of role call votes to measure legislative responsiveness).
74. For example, Swain compares the confrontational Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.
with the conciliatory William Dawson. See SWAIN, supra note 5, at 34-37. She also
reports that "fh]istorically black districts have produced both docile and militant
black representatives, and they have also rejected representatives of both types." Id.
at 47.
Diverse ideological positions also exist. For example, black conservative Republi-
can Gary Franks opposes affirmative action. See id. at 39.
75. Id. at 148-49.
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Significant variation also has been witnessed across district
lines.76
These conclusions were based not only on roll-call data, but
also on opinions and impressions reported in the media, inter-
views, and Swain's work in the field.7 Swain has provided indi-
vidual examples of strong versus weak legislative heart among
both white and black members of Congress. Except for analysis
of voting ratings, however, Swain's work never attempted to
measure the overall strength of legislative heart among black
and other minority members of Congress. It also failed to exam-
ine the difference in such strength of commitment between
white representatives on the one hand, and black or Hispanic
representatives on the other.
One recent study that has attempted to measure commitment
apart from voting records was conducted by Michael Cobb and
Jeffrey Jenkins.s One aspect of this study considered the bills
sponsored in the 103d Congress (1993-1994). 79 The sample con-
sisted of bills that offered symbolic benefits to blacks, indirect
social benefits, direct social benefits, indirect economic benefits,
and direct economic benefits.8 0 The results are as follows:
TABLE ONE
Legislation Beneficial to Blacks, by Type and Sponsor81
Type of
Legislation # of Reps # of Black Reps # of Resolutions
76. Swain compiled the roll-call vote ratings of four white representatives: Robin
Tallon, Tim Valentine, Lindy Boggs, and Peter Rodino, Jr., each of whom was from
a district in which blacks comprised a majority or a substantial minority. See id. at
158-59 thl. 7.2. COPE and LCCR ratings varied, for example, between Rdino (with
ratings generally in the 90 to 100 range) and Valentine (with COPE ratings in the
37 to 44 range and LCCR ratings varying from 60 to 100). See id.
77. See id. at x, 227-31.
78. See Cobb & Jenkins, supra note 68.
79. See id. at 7.
80. See id. at 9-10.
81. Id. at *34 tbl.2. Bills involving health care, education, civil rights, and dis-
crimination are examples of socially based bills. Bills seeking to redistribute income
or wealth in ways that advantage blacks, or simply provide greater economic oppor-
tunities for blacks, exemplify the economic dimension. See id. at 9-10.
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Symbolic 30 17 55
Indirect Social 33 7 33
Direct Social 19 10 23
Indirect Economic 27 10 27
Direct Economic 9 6 12
Thus, black representatives were found to disproportionately
sponsor not only legislation that offered symbolic benefits to
blacks, but also legislation that offered direct social and econom-
ic benefits.
In this Article, I further explore the issue of strength of desire
and commitment of individual members of Congress toward mi-
nority interests, and I examine the issue of representation by
Congress collectively. This is done through a time series study,
exploring congressional responsiveness and the advocacy efforts
of individual representatives. The study covers a period of al-
most thirty years and deals with the policy issue of fair lending.
C. Legislative Heart As a Measure of Legislative Voice
1. The Quantitative I Qualitative Research Debate
In their influential 1994 work on social science research, Gary
King, Robert Keohanne, and Sidney Verba take the position that
neither quantitative nor qualitative research is superior to
the other, regardless of the research problem being ad-
dressed. Since many subjects of interest to social scientists
cannot be meaningfully formulated in ways that permit sta-
tistical testing of hypotheses with quantitative data, we do
not wish to encourage the exclusive use of quantitative tech-
niques.8 2
Chaos theory, as applied to legislative decision making, leads to
the conclusion that legislative policy responsiveness falls within
this category of social science research. Quantitative data may
serve as one source of information that leads to an assessment
82. GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALrrATrvE RESEARCH 5-6 (1994).
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regarding responsiveness, but qualitative data is also useful for
such assessment."
Past empirical studies have relied upon quantitative measures
of representation. For example, Sam Peltzman's work has com-
bined public choice with law and economics perspectives and has
relied upon Senate voting as the measure of responsiveness.'
Roll-call voting as a measure of responsiveness has been em-
ployed frequently in empirical studies, regardless of their theo-
retical bent.85 For example, the Miller-Stokes congruence mod-
el, which has had enormous influence on political science re-
search methodology, relied on roll-call voting as a measure of
constituency influence on members of Congress.86 This Article
takes the position that for purposes of exploring legislative
heart, quantitative data is useful, but qualitative data is equally
important.
2. Chaos Theory's Contribution
Chaos theory has transformed scientific research. 7 It is now
being explored in the social sciences, including political science,
as a lens through which to view evidence." It is particularly
83. King, Keohanne, and Verba's description of the dividing line between quantita-
tive and qualitative research is adopted for purposes of this Article. They describe
quantitative research as that which "uses numbers and statistical methods. It tends
to be based on numerical measurements of specific aspects of phenomena . . Id.
at 3. They then define qualitative research in the following terms:
Qualitative research, in contrast, covers a wide range of approaches, but
by definition, none of these approaches relies on numerical measure-
ments. Such work has tended to focus on one or a small number of cas-
es, to use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials,
to be discursive in method, and to be concerned with a rounded or com-
prehensive account of some event or unit.
Id. at 4.
84. See Sam Peltzman, An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional
Voting in the Twentieth Century, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 656 (1985).
85. See Malcolm E. Jewell, Legislators and Constituents in the Representative Pro-
cess, in HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATivE RESEARCH 118-23 (Gerhard Loewenberg et al.
eds., 1985); see also supra notes 33-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Hero-
Tolbert, Overby-Cosgrove, and Swain studies).
86. See Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress,
57 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 45, 48-49 (1963).
87. See JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987) (discussing the his-
tory and development of chaos theory).
88. See CHAOS THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (L. Douglas Kiel & Euel Elliot
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well suited to the study of legislative dynamics.89
Chaos theory concludes that outcomes are unpredictable. This
unpredictability exists for several reasons, including complexi-
ty" and nonlinear effects,9 that characterize legislative deci-
sion making. Decisions are the product of many factors which
vary in existence and influence over time. These factors include
chance occurrences and the influence of occurrences external to
the legislative process (the external environment).92 Each factor
does not have a stable or proportional impact on decision mak-
ing. Rather, the impact is nonlinear and is largely a function of
the unique synergy produced at various points in time. An im-
portant factor influencing outcomes is feedback." Feedback oc-
curs when internal experiences, external changes, and the
course of experience under a legislative enactment all have an
impact on the legislative climate for initial action and additional
change. 4 The cognition, evaluation, and influence of the infor-
mation received in feedback is unpredictable."
Chaos theory also recognizes aperiodic outcomes and the prin-
ciple of sensitive dependence on initial conditions.9 Decisions
are unpredictable, but decisions and outcomes are not random. A
general boundary constrains them. Within a general boundary,
the details of particular legislative enactments also are unpre-
dictable. The reason for this unpredictability is that no single
eds., 1996).
89. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 425, 428-29 (1994) (proposing that chaos theory may provide the best
means of understanding legislative dynamics).
90. See GRIGOIRE NICOLIS & ILYA PRIGOGINE, EXPLORING CohIPLEXITY 6 (1989) (at-
tempting to define "complexity" in terms understandable to the layman).
91. A proportionate relationship exists between cause and effect in linear systems.
In nonlinear systems, the cause-effect relationship is not proportionate, and the rela-
tionship between variables is dynamic. The nonlinear nature of politics is discussed
in COURTNEY BROWN, SERPENTS IN THE SAND: ESSAYS ON THE NONLINEAR NATURE
OF POLITcs AND HUMAN DESTINY 1-8 (1995).
92. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 89, at 432-35.
93. See id. at 434.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See JACK COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS: DISCOVERING SIM-
PLICITY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 235-63 (1994). Scientists refer to "strange attractions"
as constraints on outcomes, creating outer boundaries. Cf GLEICK, supra note 87, at
133-44 (discussing the development of "strange attractors").
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equilibrium point, or outcome, exists; rather, there are an al-
most infinite number of equilibrium points. Thus, if repetition of
the decision-making process was possible, then the same forces
would yield somewhat different results. This is the aperiodic
nature of decision making."7
In addition, individual commitment to action on a particular
policy issue, or to a particular action, depends not only on the
forces exerting influence but also on the background and beliefs
of each individual representative. No two individuals will react
identically, despite having identical demographic characteristics,
such as being a Northern white Democrat. Similarly, a group
will react differently in the long term, depending on the initial
input of these individual members, as well as their continuing
contributions. This unpredictable, long-term variance is based on
individual variations and their influence on group dynamics over
time, and reflects chaos theory's principle of sensitive depen-
dence on initial conditions. 8
These principles of chaos theory contain several implications
for our research methodology. First, a long-term study is neces-
sary. Because of complexity, one enactment is an unreliable
measure of the responsiveness of the legislative body as a whole.
Enactments may occur for many reasons, and at times are not
motivated principally by a desire to address the needs of the
targeted group. Moreover, the details of the enactment are as
important, if not more important, in assessing responsiveness.
Enactments become one measure of responsiveness to be supple-
mented with other evidence. For the same reason, inaction over
a short term is also an unreliable measure of responsiveness.
Second, given the uncertainty inherent in relying on action or
inaction as the sole measure of responsiveness, the reasons be-
hind a representative's action or inaction are more important
than the acts themselves. Third, because of complexity, nonlin-
ear relationships between cause and effect, and the aperiodic
nature of outcomes, the details of proposals and outcomes must
be explored to provide a window through which to view legisla-
97. Cf GLEICK, supra note 87, at 299-300 (describing the aperiodic character of
biological organisms).
98. See COHEN & STEWART, supra note 96, at 235-36.
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rive heart.
Finally, a study of responsiveness cannot occur in a vacuum.
Rather, external forces influence assessments of legislative heart
at particular points in time, and actions on related initiatives
provide a more complete picture of legislative heart. Such exter-
nal forces are one aspect of the concept of feedback. The feed-
back concept also helps to tie administrative action to legislative
responsiveness. Administrative action might fill the gaps or
ameliorate the deficiencies in legislation, and thereby relieve the
pressure for legislative amendment. Administrative action or
inaction might also stymie the effectiveness of a legislative en-
actment, and thereby highlight the need for further legislative
action. Subsequent legislative response must be judged in this
environment. With complexity and nonlinearity as characteris-
tics of the legislative process, however, a long time-series for
study is necessary to provide a useful view of legislative heart.
All of these considerations relate to our study of the collective
responsiveness of Congress, as well as to the responsiveness of
individual members. Black and Hispanic members will form a
significant group in Congress, but will remain a numerical mi-
nority even after race-based redistricting. Nonetheless, one focus
in our study is on these individuals. One reason is that chaos
theory teaches us that action or inaction by Congress as a whole,
and the details of any such action or inaction, are unpredictable.
This is true in both the short term and the long term. Another
reason is that unless consistent, collective responsiveness is
demonstrated, constituents justifiably look at least to the indi-
vidual efforts of their representatives to provide them with a
voice.
3. A New Approach to the Study of Legislative Voice
I propose a two-part methodology for the study of policy re-
sponsiveness. It consists of a search for (a) legislative compas-
sion, and (b) the environment in which representative voice is
manifested.
For the legislative body as a whole, the legislative compassion
component is found in the following evidence:
- enactments over the course of time;
- the reason(s) for such enactments;
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- the details of bills enacted, focusing on the benefit or detri-
ment of each detail to the group;
- the reason(s) for adoption of such details;
- legislative initiatives, such as amendments proposed, regard-
ing bills on the legislative agenda that offered benefits for, or
detriments to, the group;
- the reason(s) for such actions, particularly the blocking of
such initiatives;
- other legislative proposals by members of the legislative or
executive branch, that offer benefits for, or detriments to the
group over the existing legal landscape;
- the reason(s) for these proposals and for the failure of the
proposals to become part of the legislative agenda; and
- legislative feedback and reaction not otherwise encompassed
within the categories described above, such as hearings held or
studies conducted.
The legislative compassion component draws from Polsby's
analysis of community power," which considers success00 to
be the best measure of power, but not its sole measure. Polsby's
analysis also considers gain-loss analysis' °' and
participation' °2 as possible measures. Polsby's reliance on suc-
cess is suspect when applied to representative voice. Moreover,
the emphasis is as much on the reason(s) for the various actions
that representatives take, to the extent such reasons are known,
as it is on the actions themselves.
99. See NELSON W. POLSBY, COMMUNITY POWER AND POLmCAL THEORY (2d ed.
1980).
100. See id. at 136-38. Polsby describes "success" in the context of community pow-
er in the following terms:
Three kinds of events can be considered as, in some sense, indices of
success: when an actor initiates some community policy, meets with no
opposition, and it is enacted; when an actor prevents the policy of some
other actor from being enacted; and when an actor initiates a policy,
meets with opposition, and the policy is enacted.
Id. at 136.
101. See id. at 132-36. As applied to legislative voice, gain/loss analysis focuses on
the details of enacted legislation and evaluates who gains and who loses as a result
of such statutory particulars.
102. See id. at 123-32. "Participation," for purposes of this Article, focuses on repre-
sentative participation, because silent minorities will enjoy little or no direct partici-
pation in legislative debate and decision making.
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Overall, the search is for legislative heart-a desire to address
the needs of minorities-and a commitment to finding ways to
address these needs. Thus, the search for reasons for action or
inaction actually is a search for strength of legislative desire and
commitment-e.g., strong desire and commitment can be found
in a strong House/Senate proposal stymied by Senate filibuster
or weak desire and commitment can be found in a strong propos-
al by only a small group in the Senate and House. One of the
two questions I will explore is whether black and Hispanic mem-
bers of Congress generally exhibit stronger legislative heart than
does Congress as a whole: in other words, whether these minori-
ty legislators' desire and commitment is measurably different.
The proposed approach relies on qualitative evidence. A study
of bills enacted, bills blocked, and proposals introduced can be
largely a quantitative study-a simple tally of responses. This is
the approach most often relied upon in past empirical research
that used congressional roll-call votes to measure legislative re-
sponsiveness to constituent interests. °3 The proposed approach
begins with such a tally, but it then insists first on evaluating
the benefit or detriment of particular actions, and second, on
uncovering, if possible, the reasons for a particular action or
case of inaction. The search for reasons often relies on the expla-
nation for action or inaction that is identified (but not explained)
by the source materials--e.g., Senate filibusters, no proposal or
no strong proposal endorsed by the House or Senate, or leader-
ship opposition.
The research methodology to assess legislative compassion
outlined above is directed at the Congress as a whole. This is
the first focus of this Article-the possibility of collective policy
responsiveness. A second focus of this Article is to assess the
possibility and strength of legislative voice through individual
efforts. This study focuses on the legislative heart of individual
white versus black or Hispanic members of Congress. The search
is similarly for legislative compassion, but the compassion of
individuals as opposed to Congress as a whole. Congressman
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. exemplifies strong legislative heart-
measurably stronger than Congress as a whole during the same
103. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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time period.104 Bills proposed, individual advocacy efforts taken
or foregone, the details of such proposals and advocacy positions,
and voting record ratings fall within the research components of
actions taken and not taken that are necessary for assessing
individual legislative compassion. In addition, the reason(s) for
such action or inaction should be explored, although the evi-
dence may be more difficult to obtain for individuals. Absent
such evidence, legislative compassion is inferred from the very
existence and nature of action or inaction over a period of time.
A baseline is the legislation enacted. Individual proposals and
actions then can be compared with the generally endorsed out-
come in order to assess strength of desire and commitment.
Legislative heart is revealed through action and inaction, in
their various forms, and the reasons for each. To fully under-
stand legislative dynamics, however, one must be aware of the
environment in which legislative voice is manifested. An under-
standing of the legislative environment provides additional infor-
mation useful for evaluating legislative compassion. At times,
environment also provides evidence of responsiveness or unre-
sponsiveness that would not be captured otherwise.
Environment, for purposes of this Article, consists of the follow-
ing:
- administrative and/or court actions taken in implementing a
legislative enactment-interpreting its provisions and enforcing
its contents-and the reason(s) for such actions;
- administrative and/or court actions not taken in implement-
ing a legislative enactment, and the reason(s) for such inaction;
and
- external occurrences exacerbating, highlighting, or amelio-
104. For example, on more than 100 occasions in the 1950s, Congressman Powell
unsuccessfully sought to add nondiscrimination amendments to appropriation bills for
federal aid to housing, education, and other matters. See STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON
THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT 23 & n.26 (1995). He also persuaded the Kennedy Administration, after
persistent urgings, to take two early steps aimed at prohibiting groups that received
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race. See id. at 24. Finally, as
Chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, Congressman Powell delayed for-
warding even liberal legislation to the Rules Committee when he thought it did not
contain enough benefits for blacks. See RICHARD F. FENNO JR., CONGRESSMEN IN
CoMMIrrEES 131 (1973).
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rating the particular need at which legislative proposals were
directed.
The first two factors can be described as the "internal envi-
ronment," evidencing the development of, and experience un-
der, the particular legislative issue addressed by Congress. The
last factor can be described as the "external environment,"
evidencing an external, independent influence on legislative
action on the particular issue under study.
Administrative action is an important part of the environ-
ment for or against legislative response. Administrative agen-
cies, at times responding to executive wishes, have enormous
leverage and power to realize or frustrate policy initiatives.
The lobbying efforts of interest groups reflect this power.
Schlozman and Tierney asked lobbyists how important each
institution was as a focus of their activity. The results were as
follows: 5
105. SCHLonzAN & TIERNEY, supra note 18, at 272 tbl.11.2. Moreover, of the re-
spondents identifying various targets as being "very important," the breakdown by
type of group conducting the lobbying effort was as follows:
Trade Citizens'
Corporations Associations Unions Groups
Congress 94% 91% 95% 92%
White House 67% 59% 37% 40%
Executive agencies 68% 82% 58% 40%
Courts 18% 21% 28% 28%
Id.
Similarly, Berry surveyed national public interest groups and found that the
targets of their lobbying efforts were the following.
Major Target Major or Secondary Target
Congress 60% (50) 73% (61)
Administrative agency or dept. 25% (21) 47% (39)
White House (President) 2% (2) 11% (9)
Public opinion 5% (4) 11% (9)
Corporations 4% (3) 7% (6)
Other 4% (3) 12% (10)
No second target mentioned 39% (32)
100% (N=83)
BERRY, supra note 19, at 56 tbl.III-2.
Moreover, tax-exempt organizations identified administrative agencies as their
primary lobbying target almost as often as they identified Congress as a target (42%
versus 44%). See id at 57 tbl.HI-3.
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TABLE TWO
Focus of Interest Group Lobbying Activity, by Institution
Very Somewhat Not too
Institution Important Important Important
Congress 89% 8% 2%
White House 55% 32% 12%
Executive agencies 65% 28% 6%
Courts 22% 27% 51%
The research procedure employed in this Article is influenced
by King, Keohane and Verba's exhortation to employ "scientific re-
search" methods in the social sciences. One aspect of such a re-
search design is that the procedures are public. As King and his
colleagues stated:
Scientific research uses explicit, codified, and public methods
to generate and analyze data whose reliability can therefore be
assessed. Much social research in the qualitative style follows
fewer precise rules of research procedure or of inference. As
Robert K. Merton put it, "The sociological analysis of qualita-
tive data often resides in a private world of penetrating but un-
fathomable insights and ineffable understandings. ... [How-
ever,] science ... is public, not private." Merton's statement is
not true of all qualitative researchers (and it is unfortunately
still true of some quantitative analysts), but many proceed as if
they had no method-sometimes as if the use of explicit meth-
ods would diminish their creativity. Nevertheless they cannot
help but use some method. Somehow they observe phenomena,
ask questions, infer information about the world from these
observations, and make inferences about cause and effect. If
the method and logic of a researcher's observations and infer-
ences are left implicit, the scholarly community has no way of
judging the validity of what was done. We cannot evaluate the
principles of selection that were used to record observations,
the ways in which observations were processed, and the logic
by which conclusions were drawn. We cannot learn from their
methods or replicate their results. Such research is not apublic
act. Whether or not it makes good reading, it is not a contribu-
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tion to social science."
Ill. AN EXPLORATORY STUDY: CONGRESS AND FAIR LENDING
The fair lending debate has focused both on allegations of dis-
criminatory actions directed at individual applicants, and on
allegations of discriminatory policies directed at neighborhoods
or other geographic areas that are predominantly black or His-
panic. It is thus both a civil rights issue and a business reinvest-
ment issue pursuant to government mandate.
Nationwide data on the extent of the possible discriminatory
actions against individual loan applicants have been collected.
The most recent data reported by the Federal Financial Institu-
tions Examination Council is for calendar year 1995."' During
1995 financial institutions rejected black mortgage loan appli-
cants twice as often as white applicants." The disparity re-
mained wide even when the data were adjusted for income. 9
This disparity is as great, if not greater, than that documented
by federal regulators more than twenty years ago."0
106. KING ET AL., supra note 82, at 8.
107. See Judith Evans, HUD Expands Access to Minority Loan Data, WASH. POST,
Aug. 3, 1996, at El.
108. See id. The rates of rejection for home purchase loans were 40.5% of mortgage
applications of blacks, 29.6% of mortgage applications of Hispanics, and 20.6% of mort-
gage applications of whites. See id. For 1994, the rates of rejection for home purchase
loans were 33.4% of mortgage applications of blacks, 24.6% of mortgage applications of
Hispanics, and 16.4% of mortgage applications of whites. See Minority Applicants Gain
on Home Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at D8.
109. See Serving All Bank Customers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at A6.
110. During 1974, the Comptroller of Currency collected data on home financing
decisions in six Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) across the United
States, and analyzed the data according to the applicants' race. See COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, FAIR HOUSING LENDING PRACTICES PILOT PROJECT 1.1-II.1 (1975),
reprinted in Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments and Consumer Leasing
Act-1975: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 481, 482-85 (1975) [hereinafter
ECOA Hearings]. The Comptroller found that financial institutions' rates for denial
of loan applications were 24.77% for non-white applicants and 14.83% for white. See
id. at IV.2 tbl.1, reprinted in ECOA Hearings, supra, at 501.
See also FEDERAL HOiMiE LOAN BANK BOARD, FAIR HOUSING INFORMATION SUR-
vEY 1, at 1.1-1.2 (1975), reprinted in ECOA Hearings, supra, at 646, 648-49. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board did similar studies in six other SMSAs and ana-
lyzed the data based on the ethnicity of applicants. The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board found that rates for denial of loan applications were 18% for black applicants,
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Federal prohibitions against discrimination based on race or
ethnic origin were enacted almost thirty years ago, and have
been revisited periodically. Yet, disparate lending remains a re-
ality. Similarly, federal enactments addressing community disin-
vestment were enacted almost twenty years ago. In recent years,
they have borne some fruit, causing a commitment of more than
sixty-one billion dollars, largely in the 1990s."' Claims of red-
lining remain, however, The case study presented below ex-
plores the policy responsiveness of the United States Congress
during the 1967-1996 period on this issue of possible race-based
disparity in lending decisions and in community disinvestment.
A second focus of the study is to compare the efforts of white
and minority legislators. The aim is to gauge whether one group
has been more responsive to the interests of minorities, or
whether both groups, or at least sectors of both groups, have
been equally responsive.
12% for Hispanic applicants, and 8% for white applicants. See id. at IV.1 tbl.1, re-
printed in ECOA Hearings, supra, at 658.
111. See NATIONAL COMfUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA DOLLAR ComIT-
MENTS SINCE 1977 (1995). The NCRC study documented more than $15.3 billion in
commitments as a result of agreements negotiated with lenders, and $45.6 billion in
voluntary commitments. NCRC noted that information on voluntary commitments is
not complete (tending to focus on the largest banks) and therefore this figure sub-
stantially underestimates the actual number of commitments.
The Community Reinvestment Act was not enforced actively and was not sub-
ject to any significant community pressure, through actions such as protests of bank
expansion applications, until the late 1980s. See Community Reinvestment Act: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong.
204, 209 (1988) (statement of Martha R. Seger, Member of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 74 FED. RESERVE BULL. 307, 310 (1988)
(stating that three applications were protested in 1984 and the number of protests
increased to 35 by 1987)); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 292 (1993)
(noting that for many years the CRA was "little more than a vague statement of
principle without much real-world effect").
112. See, e.g., Judith Evans, Home Buyers Favor Suburbs Over Cities, WASH. POST,
June 29, 1996, at El, E2 (noting claims by the Housing Assistance Council that in-
ner cities are experiencing redlining by mortgage lenders); Terence Samuel, Lender
Accused of Redlining, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 4, 1996, at C1 (discussing a complaint
filed by the ACLU and the NAACP that accused one of the nation's largest mort-
gage lenders of redlining black neighborhoods).
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A. The Congress: Policy Responsiveness of the Majority
1. Actions Taken
The following enactments are the significant actions taken by
the Congress on fair lending and are the sources for this study:
- 1968 Fair Housing Act (FHA)13
- 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)"
- 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)"5
- 1976 Amendments to the ECOA"6
- 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)"7
- 1988 Fair Housing Amendments Act""
- 1989 Amendments to the HMDA and the CRA"9
- 1991 Amendments to the ECOA
120
The 1968 FHA, the 1974 ECOA, and later amendments to
these statutes are the legislative response to allegations of dis-
crimination in lending against individuals.' The 1975 HMDA
the 1977 CRA, and later amendments to these enactments are
the legislative response to allegations of discrimination in lend-
ing against neighborhoods populated by minority residents.2
113. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3609, 3615-3619 (1994)).
114. Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified-as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(e) (1994)).
115. Pub. L. No. 94-200, tit. HII, 89 Stat. 1125 (1975) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2801-2808 (1994).
116. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1691-1691(t)).
117. Pub. L. No. 95-128, tit. VIII, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905).
118. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3602, 3604-3608, 3610-3614(a), 3631).
119. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 1211-1212, 103 Stat. 524 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 2802-2804, 2807, 2902, 2906).
120. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 223, 105 Stat. 2236, 2306 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691,
1691(e)).
121. See Banking Insurance, Credit Bill Cleared, 30 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 164, 166
(1974) (noting that the ECOA bars discrimination by creditors on the basis of sex or
marital status); Congress Enacts Open Housing Legislation, 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
152, 154 (1968) (stating that the FHA prohibits discrimination in the provision or
terms of real estate loans).
122. See $12.5 Billion Urban Aid Authorization Voted, 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 126,
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This list of enactments, including amendments, reveals three
periods of activity: (1) initial action in 1968; (2) a subsequent
period of further action and refinement of initiatives during the
1974-1977 period; and (3) a final period of reassessment and re-
vision in the 1988-1991 period. This timeline reveals a fair de-
gree of responsiveness, with periods of equilibrium interrupted
by periods of turbulence as legislators recognize a need for
change and as forces coalesce to shatter the inertia. Mere enact-
ments, however, are an obviously insufficient measure of respon-
siveness. The reasons for action must be explored and the de-
tails of the enacted statutes must be examined in order to deter-
mine Congress's motivation for action and whether its response
was weak or strong.
2. Legislative Details
The 1968 FHA contained a broad prohibition against discrim-
ination in the financing of housing,123 as well as the sale and
rental of housing." In that respect it was a gain for minority
groups. However, the administrative and enforcement.provisions
in the FHA were weak. The Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) administered the FHA but it could not take
enforcement action on its own; it could act only in response to a
complaint. 125 HUD's enforcement powers were limited to trying
to "eliminate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing prac-
tice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion."126 Moreover, HUD had to suspend its enforcement ac-
tions if state or local authorities were addressing the com-
plaint.27 The Attorney General also had enforcement authori-
ty, but could only act when a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
137 (1977) (noting that the CRA would require financial supervisory agencies to con-
sider lenders' records of meeting the credit needs of low-income neighborhoods when
deciding whether they could open new branches); Congress Clears Redlining' Legisla-
tion, 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 458, 458 (1975) (stating that the HMDA "responded to
charges that lenders were 'redlining' certain city neighborhoods").
123. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 805, 82 Stat. 83-84 (1968).
124. See id. § 804, 82 Stat. at 83.
125. See id. § 810, 82 Stat. at 85-86.
126. Id. § 810(a), 82 Stat. at 85.
127. See id. § 810(c), 82 Stat. at 86.
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tion was found.'" Furthermore, the Attorney General's powers
seemed limited to injunctive relief rather than the imposition of
penalties. 29 Finally, private parties also could enforce the
FHA, but the statute imposed a 180-day statute of limitations on
such actions. 3 ' Resort to HUD proceedings was a prerequisite
to the commencement of any civil action.'"' Additionally, puni-
tive damages in such actions were limited to one thousand dol-
lars.
32
The 1974 ECOA did not mention discrimination based on ei-
ther race or national origin.' 33 It was aimed at discrimination
based on sex or marital status.3 Thus, it was not responsive
to the interests of racial minorities. This shortcoming, however,
was addressed by the 1976 amendments to the ECOA.'35 As
amended in 1976, the ECOA was in many respects a gain for
minority groups over the earlier legal landscape created by the
1968 FHA. The amended ECOA prohibited discrimination on the
part of any creditor, rather than only housing lenders.' 6 Lend-
ers were required to provide reasons for any adverse action.3"
Federal bank regulatory agencies had administrative examina-
tion and enforcement power under the banking statutes.'38 Pri-
vate civil actions were authorized, without any necessity to ex-
haust administrative remedies before commencing litigation.' 9
128. See id. § 813, 82 Stat. at 88.
129. See id.
130. See id. § 812(a), 82 Stat. at 88.
131. See id. § 810(d), 82 Stat. at 86; see also id. § 812(a), 82 Stat. at 88.
132. See id. § 812(c), 82 Stat. at 88.
133. See Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1991(e) (1994)).
134. See id. § 502, 88 Stat. at 1521.
135. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, §
701(a)(1), 90 Stat. 251 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691) (providing
that it is unlawful for any creditor to discriminate "on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age").
136. See id.
137. See id. § 701(d)(2), 90 Stat. at 252.
138. See Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 704, 88 Stat. 1522-23 (1974) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1691(c); see also Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 706(g), 90 Stat. 254 (1976) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691) (authorizing agency referral to the Attorney
General's office if the agency is unable to obtain compliance).
139. See Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 706, 90 Stat. 253-55 (1976) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1691(e)).
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Punitive damage limitations were higher under the ECOA than
under the FHA.40 Finally, the statute of limitations under the
ECOA was two years."
After 1976, the deficiencies in the 1968 FHA remained. How-
ever, some of these deficiencies could be avoided by allegations
of discriminatory lending, as opposed to discriminatory housing
practices, by utilizing the ECOA. Of course, the limited ability of
HUD or the Justice Department to enforce any fair lending
claim remained unchanged. Perhaps Congress thought that the
federal banking agencies could be relied upon to enforce the
ECOA. Experience did not support this possible assumption.
No sweeping conclusions about congressional responsiveness can
be drawn from these activities, because the strengthening of
antidiscrimination legislation that occurred in 1976 did not oc-
cur across the board-for both fair lending and fair housing.
Congress left fair housing complaints, other than those involving
lending discrimination, with a weak and ineffective enforcement
mechanism for the next twenty years.
Congress revisited the issue of lending discrimination against
individuals with the enactment of the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988." The amendments substantially strength-
ened the enforcement provisions of the FHA by granting HUD
independent enforcement power for the first time,' and by
adopting an administrative enforcement vehicle,145 amendments
also extended the statute of limitations for private parties from
180 days to two years,' 4' removed the exhaustion of ad-
140. See id. § 706(b), 90 Stat. at 253-54 (establishing a $10,000 limit on punitive
damages recovery to individuals and a limit of the lesser of $500,000 or one percent
of the creditor's net worth in class action suits).
141. See id. § 706(f), 90 Stat. at 254.
142. See infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
143. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3602, 3604-3608, 3610-3614(a), 3631 (1994)).
144. See id. § 8, 102 Stat. at 1625 (authorizing the Secretary of HUD to investi-
gate housing practices in order to determine whether a complaint should be filed,
and enabling him to file a complaint on his own initiative); see also H.R. REP. No.
100-711, at 16 (1988) (noting that under existing law, HUD even lacked the power
to bring the parties to the conciliation table).
145. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8, 102 Stat. at 1625-33 (granting HUD the authori-
ty to adjudicate complaints alleging FHA violations).
146. See id., 102 Stat. at 1633.
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ministrative remedies requirement from the 1968 FHA,4 7 and
removed the limitation on punitive damages.'48 Finally, the
amendments allowed the Attorney General to seek civil
penalties.'49
In 1991, Congress again addressed lending discrimination
against individuals by strengthening the enforcement provisions
of the ECOA.5 ° The 1991 Amendment required federal bank
examiners to notify either the Justice Department or HUD of
possible violations,' 5 ' and authorized the Justice Department
to seek actual and punitive damages for violations of the
ECOA.
152
Since 1991, evidence has been collected on the persistent dis-
parity in lending to white applicants as compared to minority
applicants. 5 ' Yet Congress has not responded further. One ex-
planation for this inaction is that the antidiscrimination laws
suffered from a lack of enforcement, in part due to lack of pow-
er."6 In Congress's view, this lack of power is now thought to
have been remedied, and the need for greater commitment is not
thought to require further legislative intervention.'55
On its face, congressional action against discrimination in
lending policies to individuals reveals slow legislative respon-
siveness. Initial action was only mildly responsive because en-
forcement authority was so weak and enforcement power so lim-
ited. After twenty years, recent amelioration of these weakness-
es reveals a more responsive commitment. This is not to say
147. See id.
148. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 40 ("The Committee believes that the limit on
punitive damages served as a major impediment to imposing an effective deterrent on
violators and a disincentive for private persons to bring suits under existing law.").
149. See Fair Housing Amendments Act § 8, 102 Stat. at 1634-35.
150. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-242, § 223, 105 Stat. 2236, 2306-07 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1691).
151. See id. § 223(c), 105 Stat. at 2306.
152. See id. § 223(b), 105 Stat. at 2306.
153. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
154. See H.R. REP. No. 100-711, at 16 (1988) ("Existing law has been ineffective
because it lacks an effective enforcement mechanism.").
155. See id. at 13 (stating that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 "seeks
to fill [the void caused by the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism] by creat-
ing an administrative enforcement system").
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that the final legislative product has effectively tackled lending
discrimination against individuals.5 6 Only desire and commit-
ment are explored in this study, however, not effectiveness of
result.
Congress's other fair lending initiative addressed allegations
of discrimination in lending based on the racial makeup of a
neighborhood or other geographic area. The 1975 HMDA was
the first legislation enacted to address this problem. 57 It was a
fact-gathering statute that required depository institutions to
maintain certain records, and to make those records available to
the public. 5 The records were to contain information re-
garding the number of residential mortgage loans originated by
the banks, broken down by census tract or zip code. 5 9 The
Federal Reserve Board was authorized to issue regulations im-
plementing the HMDA. 6'
The fact-gathering obligation was a gain for minority groups.
The deficiencies in the statute were substantial, however. First,
the HMDA provided no private right of action and no other ex-
press enforcement mechanism.' 6' Second, the data collected
was not broken down by the race or ethnic origin of the mort-
gagor.1
62
The 1977 CRA did not rectify these two deficiencies."6 The
156. Indeed, I have argued in a recent article that the statutes were not effective
and could not be effective, because of the legislative insistence on a causation re-
quirement. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures: Lending
Discrimination Laws As a Test Case, 12 J.L. & POL. 637 (1996).
157. See Pub. L. No. 94-200, tit. III, 89 Stat. 1125 (1975) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2808 (1994)).
158. See id. § 304, 89 Stat. at 1125-26.
159. See id.
160. See id. § 305(a), 89 Stat. at 1126.
161. See id. § 305, 89 Stat. at 1126-27 (failing to provide any express enforcement
mechanism within the HMDA, although providing that compliance with the HMDA
could be enforced under other statutes). The Committee report does not speak of find-
ing and ending discrimination policies by specific lending institutions. See H.R. REP.
No. 94-561, at 14 (1975). It speaks instead of "identify[ing] the beginning stages of
redlining, the point at which a neighborhood can be saved [and] provid[ing] a vehicle
for neighborhood residents, public officials and financial institutions to enter into part-
nerships with each other in joint efforts to plan reinvestment strategies ... ." Id.
162. See Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 304, 89 Stat. 1125-26 (1975) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 2803).
163. See Pub. L. No. 95-128, tit. VIII, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified as amended at
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CRA primarily reafi ed the existing obligation of depository
institutions to serve the needs of their communities, although it
emphasized that this obligation includes serving credit
needs.' It also reconfirmed that the federal bank regulatory
agencies must assess compliance with this obligation in their
examinations." This reconfirmation and emphasis was itself a
gain for minority groups, but this legislation also had its defi-
ciencies. The CRA did not authorize public disclosure of bank
examiners' findings and did not create a private right of ac-
tion.166 In addition, no express enforcement obligations were
imposed on the federal bank regulatory agencies, but instead
they were merely required to take the bank's community rein-
vestment record "into account" when evaluating an application
for bank expansions."'
In 1989, Congress revisited the issue of neighborhood lending
discrimination. As part of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Congress
amended both the HMDA and the CRA.'" In both cases, the
amendments resulted in gains for minority groups. The HMDA
was extended to apply to all mortgage lenders, including mort-
gage companies, rather than being limited to banking institu-
tions.'69 For the first time, these mortgage lenders were re-
quired to collect and report information on the income, race, and
gender of applicants. 7 The CRA was amended to require pub-
lic disclosure of portions of agency evaluations, including the
ratings of institutions' record of meeting community needs.''
Overall, Congress's responsiveness to the issue of neighbor-
hood lending discrimination has been weak. The nature of the
response has been limited and self-defeating, involving fact-gath-
ering only. Initially, no facts on race were even collected, and no
12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905).
164. See id. § 802(a), 91 Stat. at 1147.
165. See id. § 802(b), 91 Stat. at 1147; id. § 804, 91 Stat. at 1148.
166. See id. tit. VIII, 91 Stat. at 1147-48.
167. See id. § 804, 91 Stat. at 1148.
168. Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 1211-1212, 103 Stat. 183, 524-28 (1989) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2802-2810, 2902, 2906).
169. See id. § 1211(d), 103 Stat. at 525.
170. See id. § 1211(a)(3), 103 Stat. at 524.
171. See id. § 1212(b), 103 Stat. at 527.
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public disclosure of the facts were required to be made. The
relevant legislation never has created an express private en-
forcement right or a public enforcement duty.
3. Actions Refused
There are various possible explanations for the weak respon-
siveness of Congress outlined in Part III.A.2.-rival hypotheses
to that of weak legislative heart. One explanation might be that
the legislative agenda contained no stronger proposals. Table
Three 72 presents a tally of all of the proposed fair lending
bills, other than the enacted statutes, and a tally of bills that
were more responsive to the interests of minorities. Table Three
reveals that in almost all of the years studied, the majority of
bills proposed-in most years a supermajority-were more re-
sponsive to minority interests than the enacted legislation.
These alternative proposals did not fare well in the legislative
process, however. Of the seventy-five "more-responsive" bills
introduced in the 1967-1996 period, two bills were reported out
of committee but never passed either house of Congress,' and
two bills were passed by one house. 74
Two bills reported out of committee in 1980, H.R. 5200 and S.
506, sought to strengthen the enforcement provisions of the
FHA.175 H.R. 5200 passed the House, and might have passed the
Senate but for Senate rules that permitted a filibuster coupled
with an inability to obtain the sixty votes required to invoke clo-
ture.176 The House and, seemingly, a majority of the Senate
thus were responsive to the interests of minorities by trying to
amend the FHA as early as 1980. Ultimately, this does not
change, though it may modify, our understanding of the twenty-
year period of congressional inaction documented in Part IL
172. Infra pp. 1786 tbl.3.
173. See generally 134 CONG. REC. 8470 (1988) (reporting H.R. 5094 out of commit-
tee); 126 CoNG. REc. 23,351 (1980) (reporting S. 506 out of committee).
174. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,472 (1990) (noting that S. 3049 passed the Senate);
126 CONG. REc. 14,478 (1980) (noting that H.R. 5200 passed the House).
175. See H.R. 5200, 96th Cong. (1980); S. 506, 96th Cong. (1980).
176. See Nadine Cohodas, Failure To Vote Cloture Kills Fair Housing Bill, 38
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3544 (1980) (noting that the cloture vote was 54 to 43).
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Congress never has shown significant support for further
strengthening the CRA and the HMDA. The closest Congress
came to providing additional support was when the House Bank-
ing Committee reported H.R. 5094 in 1988.177 That bill would
have removed agency discretion under the CRA, requiring rejec-
tion of expansion applications if banks had a poor CRA rat-
ing.18 This provision was added to a bill that expanded banks'
securities underwriting power.79 The bill, however, never ob-
tained approval from the Senate Banking Committee. Indeed,
Senator Proxmire, chair of that committee and chief sponsor of
the CRA, disfavored changing the law.80
The final proposal, S. 3049, passed the Senate in 1990 but
was never reported out of committee in the House.' The bill
sought to strengthen the ECOA.82 Many of its provisions
found their way into the 1991 amendment to the ECOA. The
1991 amendment dropped the provision creating a consumer
compliance program in each federal banking agency, which
aimed to improve oversight."
This evidence on the number and frequency of "more respon-
sive" bills, and the actions taken or not taken with regards to
these bills, may lead to debate on whether any further congres-
sional responsiveness existed in addition to that documented
through enactments. It is clear, however, that stronger proposals
were included in the legislative agenda, but were not enacted.
Two more hypotheses remain to be explored that might rival
177. See John R. Cranford, Weary House Panel OKs Bank-Deregulation Bill, 46
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2096, 2098 (1988).
178. See id. at 2099. The bill required the Federal Reserve Board to deny a bank
holding company's application to buy a bank in another state, unless the holding
company and its bank had an "excellent" or "good" community reinvestment rating.
See id. Banks with an "average" rating could have their applications approved only
if the banks made specific financial commitments to their community. See id.
179. See id. at 2096.
180. See John R. Cranford, Banks Upset by Price Tag on Deregulation Bill, 46
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 796, 797 (1988) ("[Senator] Proxmire . . . seems content to
turn up the heat on the regulators without changing the law. 'It's more realistic to
try to get the present law enforced,' he said . . ").
181. See generally 136 CONG. REC. 17,472 (1990) (noting that S. 3049 passed the
Senate).
182. See id. (statement of Sen. Dixon).
183. See S. 3049, § 3, 101st Cong. (1990).
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that of weak legislative heart: First, perhaps Congress believed
that it had enacted effective, strongly responsive legislation; or
second, maybe Congress was unable to enact stronger legislation
for reasons unrelated to weak legislative heart. The next section
explores these hypotheses.
4. Reasons Given and Perceived
In order to determine the motivation behind the legislative
enactments and thus assess the legislative heart of the Con-
gress, a search was conducted of the Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Reports for the 1967-1996 period. In addition, for the
years in which bills were enacted, a search also was conducted
of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac. All articles that dis-
cussed fair lending or fair housing initiatives were collected. Fi-
nally, for all years in which bills were enacted, a search of the
Congressional Record was conducted to obtain all statements by
black and Hispanic members of Congress regarding pending leg-
islation. These three sources are the source materials for this
section of the Article, as well as for Part II.B.2, the section that
discusses the advocacy efforts of individual members of Con-
gress.
a. The Initial Enactment: 1968
President Johnson repeatedly called for civil rights legislation
including fair housing provisions, beginning in 1966." His
proposals' enforcement provisions, however, were a curious ex-
ample of compromise. They required HUD to attempt to seek a
voluntary solution for discriminatory real estate practices, but
then allowed an administrative hearing and issuance of a cease-
and-desist order if a voluntary settlement could not be
184. See, e.g., President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Message (Jan. 12,
1966), in 22 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1206, 1207 (1966) (proposing legislation "to prohibit
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing"); see generally 1966 Civil
Rights Act Dies in Senate, 22 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 450 (1966) (discussing the Johnson
Administration's 1966 Civil Rights bill, the most controversial provision of which was
the open housing provision).
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reached.'8
As originally passed by the House, on August 16, 1967, the
bill that ultimately would become the 1968 Act8 6 did not con-
tain a fair housing provision."' The fair housing provisions
were added in a Senate amendment that was nearly identical to
a Johnson Administration open housing bill.s Some legisla-
tors believed that the amendment would lead to defeat of the
entire civil rights bill.'89 The bill as amended became subject to
a Senate filibuster.90 That filibuster was stopped only after
Senator Mondale, sponsor of the open housing amendment, and
Senator Dirksen, the Senate Minority Leader who had consis-
tently opposed the Mondale amendment, worked out a compro-
mise measure.'9' That compromise omitted the enforcement
power that HUD had received in the Mondale amendment.' 92
After the compromise bill passed the Senate and was sent back
to the House, some legislators supported sending it to confer-
ence, where it could be further amended, perhaps resulting in
the deletion of the fair housing provisions.'9' Ultimately, how-
ever, this did not occur."
Congress thus comprehended the 1968 FHA's weaknesses.
The weaknesses were deliberate-compromises made in order to
avoid complete defeat. Moreover, in the House, the compromise
185. See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Equal
Justice, 1 PUB. PAPERS 184, 190 (Feb. 15, 1967).
186. H.R. 2516, 90th Cong. (1967).
187. See Bill to Protect Civil Rights Workers Passes House, 23 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
778, 779-80 (1967).
188. See Congress Enacts Open Housing Legislation, supra note 121, at 156-57.
189. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield stated: "I don't think we have the votes
for an open housing amendment and if we got into a fight on that, it would endanger
the chances of Title V [HR 2516] which is in trouble enough as it is." Id. at 156.
190. See id. at 157 (noting that a cloture motion was defeated on February 20, 1968).
191. See id. at 156-59.
192. See id at 159. On its fourth attempt at cloture, the Senate adopted the mo-
tion by exactly the 65 votes needed. See id. at 160.
193. See id. at 164-65 (discussing actions of the House Rules Committee and divi-
sion among House Republicans). "Most observers believed that the bill would have
been weakened in conference and that Senate opponents of the bill might have been
able to delay or obstruct a vote on accepting a conference report, thus killing the
legislation." Id. at 164.
194. See id. (noting that the House voted to accept the Senate amendments without
change).
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was not forced upon a membership strongly committed to a more
responsive bill. Rather, the House membership was not certain
that it was committed to any open housing legislation.
b. The First Period of Turbulence: 1974-1977
The 1974 ECOA was the first bill enacted during this period
of turbulence. It prohibited discrimination by all creditors but
only on the basis of sex or marital status. The Senate had
passed such a prohibition in 1973, but it stalled in the House
Banking and Currency Committee.195 In 1974, the Senate
amended a House banking bill to add consumer protection provi-
sions, including an equal credit provision aimed at sex or mari-
tal status.'96 These Senate amendments were accepted in con-
ference.9 7 When the issue again came before the House, Rep-
resentative Leonor K Sullivan, Chair of the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs, criticized the Senate amendment for failing to
protect the elderly, minorities, and religious groups against simi-
lar discrimination.' Objections were waved aside, however be-
cause "Banking and Currency Committee Chairman Wright
Patman (D Texas) and other committee members argued that
with little time left in the session the conference report on HR
11221 presented the only opportunity for enacting restraints on
sex discrimination."'99 Congress therefore was aware that the
bill enacted in 1974 did not extend its protections to minorities,
but no strong motivation arose to expand its coverage. The
House initially had not passed any consumer protection provi-
sions, while the Senate proposals that ultimately made their
way to the final bill were directed at, and motivated by, a desire
to address the specific issue of discrimination against women.
195. See Banking Insurance, Credit Bill Cleared, supra note 121, at 169 (discussing
the earlier Senate bill that would have barred sex discrimination in credit transac-
tions); see also Consumer Credit Protection, 29 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 410 (1973) (re-
viewing the Senate consumer protection bill and its treatment in Congress).
196. See Senate Tacks Spending Ceiling onto Bank Bill, 32 CONG. Q. WELY. REP.
1616, 1617 (1974).
197. See Banking Insurance, Credit Bill Cleared, 32 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2922,
2924 (1974).
198. See id.
199. Id.
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The 1975 HMDA was the second piece of legislation in the
turbulent 1974-1977 period of legislative action on fair lending.
The proposed bill was always a disclosure-only bill.2" Many
Republicans opposed even this disclosure requirement. Republi-
can-led efforts to transform the bill into a three-year demonstra-
tion survey in a limited number of cities were rejected by a nar-
row margin of 40 to 41 in the Senate.. and 165 to 167 in the
House.0 2 Congress thus intended to pass a disclosure-only bill,
not a bill more responsive to minority interests.
The third enactment during this period of turbulence was
amendment of the ECOA. The House had passed a version of
the ECOA Amendment in 1975 that was weaker than the final
1976 enactment.20 3 The 1975 Amendment was brought before
the House and passed by a voice vote, under a suspension-of-
rules procedure. °4 This procedure required a two-thirds vote
for passage, and did not allow any amendments other than those
included in the motion to suspend the rules.205 According to
one subcommittee member, this procedure was used because the
chair of the subcommittee who had pressed for the measure felt
that "the House would be more likely to accept floor amend-
ments to weaken the bill rather than those to strengthen it."2 °5
Overall, the House probably desired a weaker, not stronger,
measure than that which was ultimately enacted. In the Senate,
the bill was strengthened to meet many of the criticisms of Rep-
resentative Sullivan, former chair of the House Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs.2 7 In 1976, Congress thus was aware of ear-
200. Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee Chairman, William
Proxmire, who sponsored the legislation, stated: There is no need to order a bank
to make loans in certain neighborhoods, or to set up new enforcement bureaucracy.
Disclosure is a better approach .... Once citizens know which banks are redlining
their neighborhoods, they are likely to favor institutions that treat the community
fairly." Elizabeth Bowman, Neighborhood Decay: Is 'Redlining' a Factor?, 33 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1040 (1975).
201. See Congress Clears 'Redlining' Legislation, supra note 122, at 461.
202. See id. at 463-64.
203. See Equal Credit Opportunity, 33 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1183 (1975).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. Id. (quoting Representative Leonor K. Sullivan's statement regarding the senti-
ments of Subcommittee Chairman Frank Annunzio).
207. See Equal Credit Opportunity, 32 CONG. Q. ALMAINAC 443, 443-44 (1976)
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lier criticisms of the 1974 Act's shortcomings, and strengthened
the new legislation in order to meet these criticisms. The legisla-
ture may have believed that it was passing an effective bill-a
responsive bill. Certainly no member proposed further strength-
ening modifications at the time of the bill's passage.
The final enactment during the 1974-1977 period of turbu-
lence was the CRA, which eventually was included in a bill fo-
cusing on amendments to the Community Development Act of
1974.28 The Administration and House bills did not mention
community reinvestment.0 9 That provision was added by the
Senate Banking Committee, in the form that ultimately was
adopted.21' A more responsive proposal was never offered by
the Senate Banking Committee or the Senate itself. The main
proponent of the bill, Senator Proxmire, wanted only to reaffirm
existing obligations. As he put it: "[Tihe section was included 'to
reaffirm that banks and thrift institutions are indeed chartered
to serve the convenience and needs of their communities.., and
needs does not just mean drive-in teller windows and Christmas
Club accounts. It means loans'."21" ' Debate centered on the aid
formulas to be used under the Community Development Act and
not on the community reinvestment provision. 12 In conference,
when a compromise was reached on the aid formula, the House
members also accepted the community reinvestment provisions
as part of the compromise.21 '
When Congress enacted the CRA, it was not interested in
passing a more responsive bill. The House did not even consider
a community reinvestment requirement until it emerged as an
issue in the conference committee's compromise proposal. Nei-
ther did the Senate advocates responsible for the measure push
for a more responsive bill. The source materials mention no con-
(discussing the provisions of the 1976 bill that was signed into law); see also Equal
Credit Opportunity, 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAc 582, 583 (1975) (presenting Representa-
tive Sullivan's criticisms of the 1974 credit discrimination provisions).
208. See $12.5-Billion Urban Aid Authorization Voted, supra note 122, at 126, 130.
209. See id. at 130-33.
210. See id. at 133-34.
211. Id. at 136.
212. See id. at 136-37 (describing deadlock over aid formulas).
213. See id. at 137.
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gressional criticism of the measure's shortcomings. The only ap-
parent criticism was by trade groups who wanted to remove the
measure entirely.214
In three of the four enactments during the 1974-1977 period,
therefore, Congress was aware of the bills' limitations but delib-
erately chose to adopt the measures with their weaknesses in-
tact. Only with regard to the 1976 Act is it possible that Con-
gress was unaware of the Act's deficiencies, thinking that they
were adopting a strong measure.
c. The Second Period of Turbulence: 1988-1991
The 1988 amendment to the FHA was the first enactment
made during this second period of turbulence. Civil rights
groups wanted an improved enforcement mechanism utilizing
only administrative law judges, and the bill reported by the
House Judiciary Committee reflected this approach.215 Prior to
the bill's passage by the House, however, a compromise was
reached that permitted a choice between administrative proceed-
ings or civil action in the case of failed HUD mediation
efforts.216 Absent this compromise, the bill faced serious trou-
ble on the House floor.21 7
The compromise measure achieved the support of the Republi-
can administration2 8 and avoided the opposition of the Nation-
al Association of Realtors, who had helped to block the 1980 fair
housing reform bill.219 As a result, it passed both the House and
214. See id. at 136 (reporting Senator Proxmire's statement that the redlining pro-
vision had been the target of intensive lobbying and scare tactics by some trade as-
sociations).
215. See Nadine Cohodas, Clear Sailing Forecast for Fair-Housing Bill, 46 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1729, 1729-30 (1988).
216. See id.
217. See id. at 1730 ("The version of HR 1158 approved by the Judiciary Commit-
tee April 27 included only the adninistrative-law-judge procedure, but Rep. Don Ed-
wards, D-Calif., and civil rights lawyers knew they would have serious trouble on
the House floor unless some sort of compromise was worked out.").
218. See Congress Clears Fair-Housing Bill, 46 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2289 (1988).
219. See Nadine Cohodas, Prognosis Good as Housing Bill Goes to Senate, 46 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1838 (1988); see also Cohodas, supra note 215, at 1729 (noting that
the National Association of Realtors opposed the original bill's administrative-law-
judge-only scheme).
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Senate by lopsided votes.22
The Congress seemed willing to enact fair housing legislation
in 1988, but support for the more responsive original bill pre-
ferred by the civil rights community was missing. Once again,
Congress was aware of the options but consciously chose a com-
promise measure.
The Bush Administration opposed the 1989 amendments to
the CRA and the HMDA, and those provisions were not included
in the Senate bill.22' In the House, the Banking Committee
had rejected the proposed amendments and reported a banking
bill without them.2 However, an amendment to the House bill
was adopted on the floor by a close margin.2" This last minute
amendment permitted the provisions to be a part of the thrift
bailout bill that went to conference, where the provisions sur-
vived.224 Congress never considered stronger measures with re-
spect to the CRA and the HMDA; it was barely willing to consid-
er the measures that were adopted.
The 1991 strengthening -of the ECOA had its genesis in the
Senate in 1990.225 In the House, the bank overhaul bill, of
which the 1991 amendment became a part, made no mention of
the ECOA."6 The Senate considered an amendment to remove
the provisions from the final bill, but rejected it.22 The House
considered no other changes to the ECOA or the FHA, but the
change adopted by Congress was a knowing, deliberate one.
In the debates surrounding the bank overhaul legislation, one
220. See Congress Clears Fair-Housing Bill, supra note 218.
221. See John R. Cranford, Bipartisan Majority Backs Tough House Bailout Bill, 47
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1449, 1452 (1989) [hereinafter Cranford, Bipartisan Majority];
John R. Cranford, House, Senate Thrift Bills Differ on Major Points., 47 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1574, 1580-81 (1989) [hereinafter Cranford, Bills Differ].
222. See John R. Cranford, House Banking's Bailout Bill Toughens Rules for S&Ls,
47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1022, 1025 (1989).
223. See Cranford, Bills Differ, supra note 221, at 1584 (noting that the vote was
214 to 200).
224. See Sweeping Thrift Bailout Cleared, 45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 117, 130-32 (1989).
225. See Bill Targets Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
2392 (1990).
226. See John R. Cranford, Banking Overhaul Bill, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1924,
1929 (1991) (discussing the consumer provisions of the Banking Committee bill).
227. See John R. Cranford, Lawmakers Go to the Wire on Bank Overhaul Bill, 49
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3439, 3442 (1991).
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other fair lending change was proposed. Representative Kennedy
suggested that banks with disparate lending records should be
required to develop plans to lend to minorities."8 The proposal
was rejected soundly.229
The House and Senate considered various changes to the
CRA, but adopted none. Indeed, in the initial mark-up of the
bank overhaul legislation, the House Banking Committee had
abandoned efforts to alter the CRA.2s As of the last enactment
in 1991, Congress had not evidenced a mood to further strength-
en fair lending requirements. They had strengthened the FHA
and ECOA in 1988 and 1991, but had repeatedly rejected at-
tempts to strengthen the CRA and HMDA.
In summary, little evidence exists to support the rival hypoth-
esis that reasons unrelated to weak legislative heart prevented
Congress from enacting stronger measures. The one possible
exception is the 1968 FHA, where a filibuster had to be over-
come. Yet, support for any fair housing bill, let alone a stronger
fair housing bill, was quite weak, thereby casting into doubt
even this example of a rival hypothesis. The time pressures of
the legislative calendar that faced the 1974 ECOA fail to qualify
as a second possible exception, because legislators exhibited no
desire or commitment to consider a stronger measure. Such a
measure simply was not included in the legislative agenda.
In addition, little support exists for the rival hypothesis that
Congress believed, at the time that the eight statutes discussed
were enacted, that they were enacting strong, responsive legisla-
tion. The possible exceptions are the 1976 and 1991 amend-
ments to the ECOA and the 1988 amendment to the FHA. Expe-
rience after 1976 quickly revealed, however, that such a view of
the ECOA was not justified. Thus, the conclusion remains that
Congress responded slowly to individual fair lending problems,
and never was committed to enacting a strong response to com-
munity fair lending problems.
228. 137 CONG. REc. 8947-50 (1991).
229. See id. at 8956-57 (reporting that the Kennedy amendments were rejected by
a vote of 152 to 241).
230. See John R. Cranford, Slow Start on Overhaul Bill Leaves Panel Little Time,
49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1648 (1991).
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5. Feedback and the Legislative Environment
Congressional action and inaction must be viewed contextual-
ly. The context that this Article focuses on involves the experi-
ence of government agencies and private parties in applying the
statutes and Congress's knowledge of shortcomings in the stat-
utes or their application. The former is part of the legislative
environment for further change, which focuses on the internal
environment. The latter results from feedback, which itself
forms a part of the legislative environment for further action.
At times, administrative interpretation and application of a
statute may compensate for its deficiencies, sufficiently protect-
ing interested parties, and making the need for legislative modi-
fication less pressing."3 At other times, court interpretation
and application of a deficient statute may enhance the protection
it offers interested parties. Neither of these possibilities has oc-
curred with respect to the fair lending statutes.
The courts have not been important players in developing the
fair lending prohibitions. Their role in applying the CRA has
been to defer to agency decisions. 2 In the FHA/ECOA arena,
231. One example of this phenomenon is the recent experience with federal bank
agencies' interpretations of the statutory prohibitions against bank securities under-
writing. During 1987-1990, the Federal Reserve Board interpreted both the Glass-
Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act to permit bank underwriting of
securities such as commercial paper, other corporate debt obligations, and corporate
stock. See Order Approving Applications To Engage in Limited Underwriting and
Dealing in Certain Securities, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 473 (1987) (allowing banks to
underwrite commercial paper); Order Conditionally Approving Applications to Engage,
to a Limited Extent, in Underwriting and Dealing in Certain Securities, 75 FED. RE-
SERVE BULL. 192 (1989) (allowing banks to underwrite corporate debt and equity
securities). This interpretation reversed the Board's long-standing interpretation of
these statutes. It came in the wake of a congressional logjam regarding attempts to
amend these statutes to expressly permit such underwriting activity. At the time, a
10% revenue limit was placed on bank underwriting activities. In 1996, the Federal
Reserve Board proposed to increase this limit to 25%. See Richard W. Stevenson,
Banks' Access to Wall Street May Widen, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at D1. Again,
this came in the wake of failed attempts to amend the Glass-Steagall and Bank
Holding Company Acts. See id.
232. In decisions to approve bank expansion applications despite adverse CRA data,
courts give great deference to the determinations of regulatory agencies. See, e.g.,
Coming Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 571 F. Supp. 396, 400-
01 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd, 736 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1984). When deciding whether to
hear CRA-based community objections to proposed merger applications, the courts
have noted that the statute does not require such hearings, and they will not be
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courts have been faced with limitations inherent in the statute
and the small number of agency or private actions that have
been initiated. In this situation, the courts' role is inherently
constrained. They cannot find violations when no action has oc-
curred, or force commencement of actions on their own initiative.
If nonlegislative action were to strengthen the effectiveness of
fair lending enactments, the actor would need to be the admin-
istrative agencies.
Federal agencies have infrequently initiated fair lending ac-
tions alleging violations of the FHA/ECOA. The federal bank
regulatory agencies obtained the power to enforce the ECOA
through the periodic bank examination process. Very few banks
have been cited for violations. The Comptroller of the Currency,
for example, conducted 3437 consumer compliance examinations
during a two-year period from 1987 to 1989 and did not cite any
institution for illegal discrimination in real estate lending."3
The experience of the Federal Reserve Board has been simi-
lar.' 4
Finally, the regulatory agencies historically have not referred
cases to the Justice Department for action. 5 In turn, the Jus-
compelled by court action. See, e.g., Washington v. Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 856 F.2d 1507, 1513 (11th Cir. 1988).
233. See Statement of Robert J. Herrmann, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Bank
Supervision Policy, Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the
Senate Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs Comm., Oct. 24, 1989, reprinted in 9 0CC
Q.J. 59 (1990).
234. During 1987-1991, the Federal Reserve Board examined 3721 banks. It cited
the following number of institutions for violations of the ECOA.
Violations Based on Violations Based Number of Banks
Year -Race/National Origin on Sex Involved
1989 0 0 0
1990 5 5 1
1991 0 0 0
1992 3 3 2
1993 7 7 7
1994 1 0 1
Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, to Joseph P. Ken-
nedy H, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance (Dec.
30, 1994); available in LEXIS, Bnking Library, Bnking File (search: Kennedy and
"fair lending law" and date is 4/12/95).
235. See Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending Discrimi-
nation, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 532, 537 (1993) (state-
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tice Department brought no actions alleging lending discrimina-
tion, in violation of the FHAJECOA, until September 1992."B
In recent years, prompted by the Clinton Administration, the
Justice Department has brought a handful of cases without
waiting for referrals from the bank regulatory agencies. 7 The
agencies have responded by protesting the Justice Department's
initiative." 8
Various explanations have been offered for this history of
agency inaction. Asserted reasons for inaction have included lack
of power, lack of commitment, lack of training and time allowed
for adequate examinations, and the difficulty of uncovering evi-
dence of wrongdoing. Regardless of their stated reasons, or their
inability or unwillingness, the conclusion remains that vigorous
agency action has not compensated for any of the statutory defi-
ciencies."
The experience with the CRA has been the same. It is fre-
quently stated that the only enforcement possible under the
CRA is denial of a merger or expansion application," ° but this
is not true. If the federal bank regulatory agencies wished to
apply the CRA aggressively, a violation of any banking statute
could lead to a cease-and-desist order. Only twice, however, has
a federal regulator issued a cease-and-desist order on CRA
grounds."
ment of James P. Turner, acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division).
236. See Fair Lending Enforcement and the Data on the 1992 Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act [HMDA]; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 103rd Cong. 53, 54 (1993) (statement of Janet Reno, Attorney General).
237. See Keith Bradsher, Regulators Join Banks in Protesting U.S. Discrimination
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at A34.
238. See id.
239. The Justice Department has been an exception to this rule, but only within
the last several years. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. An example
of the Justice Department's recent activity is its action against Chevy Chase Federal
Savings Bank, arguing for the first time that failure to locate bank branches in pre-
dominantly black neighborhoods is itself a violation of federal fair lending laws. See
Jerry Knight, U.S., Chevy Chase FSB Discussing Bias Probe, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
1994, at Fl.
240. See, e.g., Thomas P. Vartanian et al., Proposed CRA Rules Go Beyond Clear
Boundaries of Law, 13 BANKING POLY REP. 1, 14 (1994).
241. See Kenneth H. Thomas, Is CRA Enforcement Consistent?, AM. BANKER, May
1, 1992, at 4 (noting that the 1992 Farmers and Merchants Bank cease-and-desist
order was the second such order issued).
1780
1997] LEGISLATIVE HEART 1781
Similarly, merger or expansion applications have been denied
infrequently. During the first ten years of the CRA's existence,
only eight of 50,000 bank expansion applications were denied on
CRA grounds.' In recent years, including the period of in-
creased emphasis on CRA enforcement prompted by the Clinton
Administration, denials have increased. Nevertheless, only sev-
enteen denials have occurred since 1989. 4 Greater agency com-
mitment can be detected from the number of merger or expan-
sion applications recently approved with CRA-related commit-
ments or conditions imposed.2' The General Accounting Office
quickly acknowledged, however, that "regulatory guidance states
that commitments can only remedy specific problems in an oth-
erwise satisfactory CRA record and cannot be the basis for the
242. See Cranford, supra note 180, at 796.
243. The General Accounting Office reported the following data for 1989-1994:
Applications and CRA-Related Denials by Regulatory Agencies from 1989 Through
1994 (A = Applications, D = Denials)
FRB FDIC OCC OTS
Year A D A D A D A D
1989 761 1 2056 0 2782 2 939 1
1990 696 0 2099 0 3049 2 893 0
1991 551 1 1839 0 2630 0 573 0
1992 619 1 1891 0 2610 4 837 0
1993 821 2 2181 0 3612 0 785 0
1994 826 0 2883 3 4368 0 1010 0
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, CoMiUNITY REINVESTMENT AcT: CHALLENGES REMAIN
TO SuccEssFULLY IMPLEMENT CRA 30 tbl.1.6 (1995). The low number of applications
denied does not reflect a lack of community protests. See id. at 32. For example,
during the years 1993-1994, 192 applications were filed with protests lodged against
them and only one protested application was denied. See id. at tbl.1.8.
244.
Number of Applications Approved with CRA-Related Commitments or Conditions from
1989 Through 1994
FRB FDIC OCC OTS
Approved Approved Approved Approved
with with with with
Year commitments commitments conditions conditions
1989 5 0 15 2
1990 6 0 26 1
1991 7 0 18 1
1992 4 0 20 0
1993 9 0 18 0
1994 22 1 11 1
Id. at 31 tbl.1.7.
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the approval of an application." 5
Few explanations have been offered for this history of inaction
in applying the CRA. Critics have contended that such inaction
reflects a lack of commitment. 6 Regardless of the explanation,
again the conclusion is that agencies did not compensate for the
deficiencies in the statute via aggressive interpretation and ap-
plication of its prohibitions.
In recent years, the Clinton Administration has pressured
regulatory agencies to enforce the fair lending laws more rigor-
ously. In addition, community protests of bank mergers and ex-
pansions have increased, and have exacted "voluntary" commu-
nity reinvestment commitments. 47 Curiously, the regulators'
response has been to urge an easing of CRA examinations. 4
This confirms that future agency action is unlikely to strengthen
the CRA, and actually might weaken it further.
The administrative experience in implementing a statute re-
lates to legislative policy responsiveness through feedback and
subsequent action or inaction. Congressional hearings examined
the weak enforcement structure of the FHA/ECOA as early as
1978. 49 Congress repeatedly revisited not only the experiences
245. Id. at 30.
246. See, e.g., Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen
Years: It Works, but Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 293, 308 (1993).
247. See id. at 297-98.
248. See Keith Bradsher, Shift Seen in U.S. Stance on Loans in Poor Areas, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at D1 (discussing the Comptroller of the Currency's plan to
eliminate some of the more time-consuming features of the CRA examination guide-
lines, which will result in less detailed regulatory examinations); Saul Hansell, Fed
Proposal Would Ease Some Regulations for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at
A38 (stating that the Federal Reserve Board's proposed rules seek to ease the regu-
latory burden on banks).
249. See HUD Attorneys' Fees: Hearings on S. 571 Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978); Fair Housing Act:
Hearings on H.R. 3504 and H.R. 7787 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1978). Additional
hearings were conducted in 1979. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hear-
ings on S. 506 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1979: Hearings on
H.R. 2540 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979). The issue finally was revisited again in
1987. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1158 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
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of the federal agencies in enforcing both the FHA/ECOA and the
CRA, but also the issue of a possible lack of commitment on the
agencies' part.o Congress never took action to improve the
100th Cong. (1987).
250. See, e.g., Federal Government's Role in the Achievement of Equal Opportunity
in Housing: Hearings Before the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. (1971-1972) (reviewing HUD's experience under
the 1968 FHA); Equal Opportunity in Lending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1976) (scrutinizing bank agency
implementation and enforcement of the ECOA); Home Mortgage Disclosure and
Equal Credit Opportunity: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. (1976) (examining federal bank agencies' experience with
enforcement of the HMDA and ECOA); 1978 Budgets of Bank Regulatory Agencies:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. 178-80 (1978) (presenting the Comptroller of Currency's method for monitoring
bank compliance with the FHA and the HMDA); Banking Regulatory Agencies' En-
forcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong. (1978) (studying federal regulatory enforce-
ment of the FHA/ECOA prohibition against mortgage lending discrimination); Imple-
mentation and Enforcement of Fair Mortgage Lending Laws and Regulations: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong.
(1979) (reviewing bank agencies' experience enforcing fair mortgage lending laws and
regulations); Community Reinvestment Act Compliance: New York City Banks: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the
House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 97th Cong. (1982) (inquiring into federal imple-
mentation of the CRA in New York City banks); Community Reinvestment Act. Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong.,
(1988) (examining the effectiveness, and enforcement, of the CRA); Enforcement of
the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong. (1989) (reviewing concerns of consumer groups and financial institutions re-
garding the CRA); Discrimination in Home Mortgage Lending: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. (1989) (investigating federal regulatory en-
forcement of both the FHA/ECOA and the CRA/HMDA); Mortgage Discrimination:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. (1990) (reviewing regu-
latory agencies' reports on their progress in enforcing both the FHA/ECOA and the
CRAIHMDA); Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs and Coinage and the Subcomm. on Hous. and Community Dev. of
the House Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. (1992) (examining
the 1991 HMDA data and its implications for discrimination in lending practices);
New Hope for Old Victims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and
Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993)
(discussing implementation of CRA requirements); Community Development Financial
Institutions Act of 1993-S. 1275: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) (studying an administrative initiative to
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FHA, however, until 1988. Congress never took action on the
CRA. Even though Senator Proxmire, the original sponsor of the
CRA, was highly critical of the sparse enforcement of the
Act,"' he did not favor strengthening the statuteY2
B. Individual Members: Comparative Policy Responsiveness of
White and Minority Members
Part III of this study compares the legislative heart of non-
Hispanic white, and black or Hispanic members of Congress,
using three forms of evidence. The analysis first collects and
studies legislative proposals that are more responsive to minori-
ty interests than the current legislative landscape. "More re-
sponsive" proposals reflect a greater desire and commitment
than the levels that generally exist in Congress. The study then
explores advocacy efforts in the course of legislative consider-
strengthen regulatory enforcement of the CRA); Credit Availability in the Inner City:
Joint Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. and the
Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight, Investigations, and the Resolution of Failed Fin. Insts.
of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) (inves-
tigating regulatory enforcement of CRA); Plans and Progress to Date of Interagency
CRA Regulatory Reform Effort: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gen. Oversight,
Investigations and the Resolution of Failed Fin. Insts. of the House Comm. on Bank-
ing, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) (considering community development
proposals and CRA reforms); President Clinton's Community Reinvestment Act Reform
Initiative and Enforcement of Federal Fair Lending Laws: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin., and
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) (reviewing an administration initiative to strength-
en regulatory enforcement of the CRA and fair lending laws); Fair Lending Enforce-
ment and the Data on the 1992 Home Mortgage -Disclosure Act I7-MDA]: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993)
(examining federal banking agencies' enforcement efforts under the HMDA); Fair
Housing Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1994) (scrutinizing HUD and Justice
Department implementation of the 1988 FHA amendments).
251. See Cranford, supra note 180, at 796. Senator Proxmire complained that only
a minute percentage of bank expansion applications have been denied because the
applicant banks were found deficient in meeting their community reinvestment obli-
gations. See id. Senator Proxmire declared it inconceivable that all the other banks
were performing so well at meeting their reinvestment obligations when "so many
neighborhoods are continuing to fail." Id.
252. Banking deregulation bills later considered by the Senate Banking Committee
failed to address the issue of community reinvestment. See id. at 797. Senator
Proxmire himself seemed satisfied "to turn up the heat on the regulators without
changing the law." Id.
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ation of current statutes. These efforts also permit comparisons
with the desire and commitment of Congress generally. Addi-
tionally, they may permit comparison between individual white
and black or Hispanic members in the context of individual leg-
islative initiatives, including the efforts made to influence the
specific details of an enactment. Finally, the study compiles vot-
ing record ratings of black and Hispanic members following the
1992 legislative redistricting. This compilation updates and per-
mits comparison with the earlier study conducted by Swain."
The first two types of evidence come from the study of fair
lending legislation during the 1967-1996 period. The third type
of evidence is broader in scope, covering voting records on many
legislative proposals during the 1993 and 1994 legislative ses-
sions.
1. Proposals for Action
The bills introduced in Congress were collected for the period
between January 1967 and June 1996.' The collection in-
cludes all bills dealing with the fair lending issues discussed in
this Article. Bills on related policy issues, such as community
development banks or assistance for low income housing, were
not included unless they also dealt with fair lending issues.
Table Three summarizes the findings with respect to sponsor-
ship of more responsive bills. Any bills actually enacted into law
were excluded because sponsorship and advocacy of enacted leg-
islation is analyzed separately. Enacted legislation formed the
baseline for comparison in the session in which it was enacted,
and in all later sessions. Bills were deemed "more responsive" to
the interests of minority groups if they provided a greater scope
of coverage or protection, or greater remedies than the baseline.
253. See SWAIN, supra note 5; supra notes 55-67, 72-76 and accompanying text.
254. In the 1967-1989 period, the source was Digest of Public General Bills and
Resolutions. In the 1990-1996 period, the source was Commerce Clearing House Con-
gressional Index.
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TABLE THREE
Fair Lending Bills Introduced During 1967-1996
Year # of Bills Bills "More Black/ White Both Black/
Introduced Responsive" Hispanic Members Hispanic
to Interests Members Only and White
of Minority Only Members
Groups
1967 12 8 2 3 3
1968 5 4 0 4 0
1969 1 1 0 1 0
1970 1 1 0 0 1
1971 1 1 0 1 0
1972 5 0 0 0 0
1973 5 1 1 0 0
1974 8 5 0 3 2
1975 10 2 0 2 0
1976 1 0 0 0 0
1977 8 6 1 4 1
1978 1 1 0 1 0
1979 4 4 0 4 0
1980 4 4 0 4 0
1981 6 4 0 3 1
1982 0 0 0 0 0
1983 6 5 0 4 1
1984 0 0 0 0 0
1985 4 4 0 4 0
1986 3 3 0 3 0
1987 6 6 0 5 1
1988 5 4 0 3 1
1989 6 3 0 2 1
1990 1 1 0 1 0
1991 2 2 1 1 0
1992 2 1 1 0 0
1993 3 2 0 1 1
1994 1 0 0 0 0
1995 3 0 0 0 0
1996 1 1 1 0 0
TOTAL 115 75 7 54 14
1786
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Table Three reveals congressional interest in fair lending
throughout the 1967-1996 period, and a consistent commitment
on the part of some representatives to obtain more responsive
legislative enactments. Table Four correlates this responsiveness
to the total number of black and Hispanic members of Congress
(both House and Senate) during four periods-the three periods
of legislative turbulence 5 and the recent period after race-
based redistricting.
TABLE FOUR
More Responsive Bills Introduced During 1967-1996
Year # of Black
and Hispanic
Members of
Congress*
1967-
1968
1974-
1977
1988-
1991
1993-
1996
21-22
31-36
56-58
# of "More
Responsive"
Bills
% of Total
Bills That
were "More
Responsive"
70.1
51.9
71.4
37.5
% of "More
Responsive" Bills
Sponsored by
White Members
Only
58.3
64.3
70
33.3%
*Excluding non-voting delegates, and Adam
fused to seat in the 90th Congress
Clayton Powell, Jr., whom the House re-
No linear correlation exists between the total number of black
and Hispanic members and the total number of more responsive
bills. Similarly, no linear correlation exists between the total
number of black and Hispanic members and the percentage of
255. The initial period includes both 1967 and 1968, even though legislation was
enacted only in 1968, because consideration of the bill spanned the 1967-1968 period
and because any one-year-only interval may yield a distorted picture.
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all proposed bills that were more responsive. This indicates that
minority membership does not affect the total number or per-
centage of more responsive proposals.
Tables Three and Four, however, do reveal an important im-
pact of black and Hispanic members on the legislative process,
in the form of disproportionate commitment generally, and dis-
proportionate voice in a conservative body specifically. Seventy-
two percent of all of the more responsive bills introduced be-
tween 1967 and 1996 were sponsored by white members
only.16 This reveals responsiveness among white members, but
also reveals a disproportionate commitment on the part of black
and Hispanic members. The complexity characterizing legislative
dynamics will result in variations in this percentage figure from
year to year. The long time period of this study more accurately
reflects differences in commitment.
During the 1967-1996 period, the total black and Hispanic
membership of Congress (including both the House and the Sen-
ate, excluding nonvoting delegates) went from 1.7% in 1967, to
4.1% ten years later (1977), 5.8% twenty years later (1988) and
rose to 10.5% in recent years (1996) after redistricting." The
disproportionate commitment is reflected by the fact that twen-
ty-eight percent of the more responsive bills were either spon-
sored or co-sponsored by black or Hispanic members, while black
or Hispanic members constituted, at most, one-tenth of Con-
gress.
In addition, bills that were more responsive to minority inter-
ests were sponsored predominantly by white members until a
combination of Republicans and conservative Democrats ac-
quired control of Congress in November, 1992. Thereafter, the
percentage of more responsive bills sponsored or co-sponsored by
black and Hispanic members jumped from the thirty to forty-two
percent range to sixty-six percent. 8 Again, this was a period
256. See supra notes 68-69, 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of
Cobb and Jenkins's study of legislation beneficial to minorities).
257. See supra p. 61 tbl.4 (listing the number of black and Hispanic members of
Congress).
258. The small number of bills in the 1993-1996 period might be responsible for
this change. A similar pattern is found, however, in the 1990-1992 period. This peri-
od, which preceded Republican control of Congress, also had a small number of bills,
yet 80% of the bills could be considered "more responsive," and 50% of the bills
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in which such members constituted only 10.5% of the Congress.
The analysis of individual members' legislative heart does not
seek to predict enactment. Rather, it seeks to measure respon-
siveness in the form of legislative voice. The evidence of more
responsive proposals indicates an even greater significance for
black and Hispanic legislative voice in a conservative, Republi-
can Congress.
2. Advocacy Efforts in Committee and on the Floor
Looking beyond the numbers of more responsive bills pro-
posed, it is useful to examine the individuals who actively sup-
ported the more responsive measures that were reported by com-
mittee and thus became part of the legislative agenda, although
not enacted. In addition, it is useful to examine individual advo-
cacy efforts in connection with the fair lending enactments.
The first stage of this analysis considers legislators' advocacy
efforts for the four "more responsive" bills on the legislative
agenda. Two of these bills, introduced in 1980, sought to
strengthen the FHA. The 1980 effort began in the House with
H.R. 2540, sponsored by Representative Don Edwards (D. Calif.)
and Representative Robert F. Drinan (D. Mass.). 9 The House
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights approved an
amended bill that was stronger than the original proposal, and
was designated H.R. 5200.260 The House Judiciary Committee
reported the bill on March 4, 1980.261 The bill significantly in-
creased HUD's enforcement powers,62 and was supported by
civil rights groups and the Carter Administration. 6 s
were sponsored only by white members of Congress.
259. See Nadine Cohodas, Congress Considering Bills To Broaden Federal Powers on
Housing Discrimination, 37 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1969 (1979).
260. See id. Despite objections from real estate appraisers and members of the in-
surance industry, the subcommittee voted to amend H.R. 2540 to specifically include
both groups within the scope of the bill's coverage. See id.
261. See Nadine Cohodas, House Panel Ors Fair Housing Amendments, 38 CONG.Q. WKLY. REP. 671 (1980); see also Fair Housing Bill Stalled in Senate Panel, 38
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 812 (1980) (discussing a Senate bill similar to the House bill
that was being considered during the same period).
262. See Nadine Cohodas, Fair Housing Bill Passed by the House, 38 CONG. Q.
WKLY, REP. 1613, 1615 (1980) (summarizing enforcement provisions).
263. See Nadine Cohodas, Battle Lines Drawn Over New Enforcement Powers for
HUD, 38 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1175 (1980) (revealing a statement from one of Pres-
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In the House, Representative Edwards was ready to fight for
the bill.2 Representatives John F. Seiberling (D. Ohio) and
Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R. N.Y.) also played roles in avoiding dilu-
tion of its provisions, by sending a letter to all House members
opposing any exemption for real estate appraisers.265
On June 12, 1980, the House passed H.R. 5200.266 The final
vote was 310 to 95, but during the intense floor struggle, a one-
vote margin avoided possible emasculation of the new enforce-
267
ment powers.
In the Senate, a companion bill (S. 506) had been introduced
by Birch Bayh (D. Ind.), chair of the Judiciary Committee's Con-
stitution Subcommittee.26 The measure was supported by
Howard M. Metzenbaum (D. Ohio), another subcommittee mem-
ber.269 However, Bayh repeatedly was unable to get a quorum
in subcommittee, in order for a mark-up to occur.2 70 Finally, a
weakened bill was approved.27' The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee approved by voice vote a version of S. 506 that more closely
resembled the House bill. In the Senate, the bill was sup-
ported by Bayh and Edward M. Kennedy (D. Mass.), who met
with opponents of the measure as well as Republican supporters
Jacob K. Javits (R. N.Y.) and Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R.
ident Carter's Domestic Policy Staff members, indicating that the Administration saw
the bill as "the highest civil rights priority").
264. See id. at 1178.
265. See id.
266. See Cohodas, supra note 262, at 1613.
267. See id. The amendment would have shifted administrative law judges (ALJs)
from HUD to the Justice Department; prohibited recent HUD investigators from be-
ing appointed as AILJs; prohibited firing an ALJ except through government person-
nel procedures; and required HUD to refer all zoning and land-use cases to the at-
torney general. See id. The amendment's sponsors claimed that their proposal would
strengthen existing law, but opponents believed it would gut the bill. See id.
268. See Fair Housing Bill Stalled in Senate Panel, supra note 261, at 812.
269. See id.
270. See Fair Housing Setbacks, 38 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1410 (1980) (reporting
that Senator Bayh failed to obtain a quorum for seventh time in nine months, pro-
voking him to claim that the "Republicans [were] determined not to have a fair
housing bill").
271. See Nadine Cohodas, Senate Judiciary Panel Significantly Weakens New 'Fair
Housing' Bill, 38 CONG. Q. WELY. REP. 1570 (1980) (explaining that the weakened
version contained a number of amendments strongly opposed by civil rights groups).
272. See Fair Housing Bill Approved, 38 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2162 (1980).
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Md.), to attempt to negotiate their differences.273 The bill died
in the Senate, however, when it faced filibuster and failure to
obtain a cloture vote. 74
The 1988 proposal, H.R. 5094, attempted to strengthen the
CRA by requiring regulators to deny expansion applications if a
bank had a poor CRA rating.2 71 Its chief proponent was House
Banking Committee chairman Fernand J. St. Germain (D.
R.I.).176 In committee, his strongest allies were Robert Garcia
(D. N.Y.), Walter E. Fauntroy (D. D.C.), Joseph P. Kennedy II
(D. Mass.), and Charles E. Schumer (D. N.Y.). 77
The last bill to make it out of committee was S 3049, which
was sponsored by Senator Alan Dixon (D. Ill.), and was passed
by the Senate in 1990.7' This bill, introduced in 1990, sought
to strengthen the ECOA and to establish separate consumer
compliance programs in each federal bank regulatory agen-
cy.279 Many of the provisions strengthening the ECOA were in-
cluded in the bill enacted by Congress in 1991.280 However, the
consumer compliance program was not.
These legislative proposals were considered in 1980, 1988, and
1990. Black and Hispanic members of Congress were active only
with the 1988 legislative proposal; one Hispanic member and
one black non-voting delegate from the District of Columbia
served as advocates.
273. See Nadine Cohodas, Fair Housing Compromise Efforts Continue, 38 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 3525 (1980).
274. See Cohodas, supra note 176 (noting that the motion to invoke cloture failed
by a vote of 54 to 43).
275. See Cranford, supra note 177, at 2099. "The bill would require the Federal
Reserve Board to deny a bank holding company's application to buy a bank in an-
other state or to expand securities or other permitted affiliate activities, unless the
holding company and its bank have an 'excellent' or 'good' community reinvestment
rating." Id. Banks with an "average" rating "could" be approved if the banks made
specific financial commitments to their communities. Id.
276. See Cranford, supra note 180, at 796. The committee's ranking Republican,
Chalmers P. Wylie (R. Ohio), co-sponsored the bank deregulation bill of which this
was a part, but did not favor the CRA amendment. See id. at 797.
277. See id.
278. See 136 CONG. REC. 17,472 (1990).
279.. See id. at 17,472-73.
280. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, § 223, 105 Stat. 2236, 2306-07 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691,
1691(e) (1994)).
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The second stage of this analysis considers legislators' advoca-
cy efforts in connection with the eight fair lending enact-
ments.28' This inquiry focuses on efforts to obtain a measure
more responsive to minority interests than that which was en-
acted, or efforts to avoid further dilution or defeat of the mea-
sure that was enacted. Such efforts reveal a commitment-a
legislative heart-that was greater than the commitment of
Congress generally. However, efforts to place an initiative on the
legislative agenda and press for its enactment also reveal legis-
lative heart-as an initiator of action-even if the proposal was
not more responsive than the law that ultimately was enacted.
a. The Initial Enactment: 1968
Two forces supported a strong enactment-a law more respon-
sive than the FHA as enacted. These forces were the lobbying
efforts of Clarence Mitchell of the Leadership Conference on Civ-
il Rights,282 and the advocacy efforts of white members of Con-
gress, particularly in the Senate, as well as the efforts of Sena-
tor Brooke (R. Ma.), the only black member of the Senate.
281. See supra notes 113-20.
282. See Effective Lobbying Put Open Housing Bill Across, 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
166 (1968).
In less than three months from the day the 90th Congress began its sec-
ond session on Jan. 15, open-housing legislation was transformed from a
goal which almost no one interested in the subject thought remotely at-
tainable in 1968 to public law ....
In talks with many of the individuals who followed the three-month
battle, Congressional Quarterly learned that the transformation was due
in large part to the efforts of Clarence M. Mitchell Jr., the chief lobbyist
for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Seldom has an individual
lobbyist been accorded so much credit for the outcome of a bill as was
Mitchell, who was also Washington director of the National Assn. for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). There was considerable agree-
ment among the persons who talked to CQ about the 1968 civil rights
battle that Mitchell was the catalyst who organized and kept together
the forces that passed the bill.
Id.
283. See id.
After lobbying fruitlessly for most of 1967, [Clarence] Mitchell scored his
first breakthrough Dec. 15 when the Senate leadership made a House-
passed bill (HR 2516) protecting civil rights workers the first order of
Senate business for 1968. Mitchell and other key officials of the Leader-
ship Conference, an organization of 115 church, labor, civil rights and
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Senator Mondale (D. Minn.) was the primary, vocal Senate advo-
cate of more responsive provisions. Mondale pressed a strong
open housing measure onto the legislative agenda as an amend-
ment to the House bill that was before the Senate and that con-
tained no open housing provision.2  However, Senator
Mondale was not the sole initiator-advocate. Both Senators
Mondale and Brooke spoke forcefully of the need for a fair hous-
ing bill,' with Brooke bringing to the attention of the Senate
the grim state of housing available to many black Ameri-
cans. 6 The offered fair housing amendment had many co-
sponsors, but Mondale and Brooke were its main sponsors.287
Senator Brooke was co-sponsoring an open housing bill that
the Republican leadership opposed.2" That act alone demon-
strated strong legislative heart. On the floor, Brooke battled
against amendments to the proposal that would have weakened
it.2"9 In addition, thirty-six liberal Senators led the fight
civic groups, set out to make the bill a vehicle for an open-housing
amendment.
The basic strategy on the bill was worked out at a Dec. 28 meeting
attended by Mitchell, several other Leadership Conference participants,
Sens. Philip A. Hart (D Mich.) (the leading Senate Democratic spokesman
for civil rights legislation), Walter F. Mondale (D Minn.), Joseph D.
Tydings (D Md.) and representatives of several other Senators. Mondale,
who was enthusiastic over the outlook, agreed to cosponsor the housing
amendment together with Sen. Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.), who was
not present but telephoned his support.
Id.
284. See Senate Passes Civil Rights Open Housing Bill 26 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
509 (1968). The Mondale amendment was co-sponsored by Senator Brooke, the only
black member of the Senate. See iU. Other Senators involved in the lobbying efforts
for a strong bill were Hart (D. Mich.), Tydings (D. Md.), Javits (R. N.Y.), Percy (R.
Ill.), and Scott (R. Pa.). See Effective Lobbying Put Open Housing Bill Across, supra
note 282, at 166.
285. See 114 CONG. REC. 2274-84 (1968).
286. See id. at 2525-26.
287. Cf id. at 3082 (noting additional cosponsors of the fair-housing amendment).
288. See Congress Enacts Open Housing Legislation, supra note 121, at 156. Minor-
ity Leader Dirksen consistently opposed the Mondale amendment, but later agreed to
a compromise open housing measure. See id& at 157-58. In spite of Dirksen's opposi-
tion, however, the voting results of an unsuccessful cloture motion and a motion to
table the amendments showed substantial Republican support for the civil rights bill
and the open housing proposal. See id. at 157.
289. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 5826 (1968) (discussing a substitute amendment that
would protect only black veterans and servicemen).
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against an amendment by Senator Ervin that would have ex-
cluded all activities that involved only state or local benefits,
services, and facilities from coverage under the civil rights mea-
sure." In the House, the advocacy position responsive to mi-
nority interests was one that sought to avoid further dilution of
the Senate bill by avoiding a conference."' The advocacy ef-
forts of Representatives Emanuel Celler (D. N.Y.), Richard
Bolling (D. Mo.), Charles E. Goodell (R. N.Y.), and Albert H.
Quie (R. Minn.),292 as well as the Democratic Study Group,
chaired by James G. O'Hara (D. Mich.) were instrumental in
preventing a conference on the bill."'
During the 1967-1968 period, there were two black or Hispan-
ic members of the Senate and seven black or Hispanic members
of the House.2" The only one of these members to exhibit
strong advocacy efforts for minority-responsive proposals was
Senator Brooke.
b. The First Period of Turbulence: 1974-1977
In the debate surrounding the 1974 ECOA, the only member
of Congress who advocated a bill more responsive to minority
interests was Representative Leonor K. Sullivan (D. Mo.), chair
of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs. The proposal to in-
clude not only women but also minority groups within the scope
of the equal credit opportunity bill originally was sponsored by
Sullivan, Henry Gonzalez (D. Tex.), Parren Mitchell (D. Md.),
and Andrew Young (D. Ga.).295 Only Representative Sullivan,
however, pressed for passage of this broader bill, from 1974
through 1976. She commended the proposed bill for barring
credit discrimination against women, but criticized it for failing
290. See Congress Enacts Open Housing Legislation, supra note 121, at 156.
291. See id. at 164-65.
292. See id. at 165. The work of Charles E. Goodell and Albert H. Quie, who or-
ganized Republican support for the Senate bill, was one of the key factors in the
House outcome. See Effective Lobbying Put Open Housing Bill Across, supra note
282, at 168.
293. See Effective Lobbying Put Open Housing Bill Across, supra note 282, at 167-68.
294. See Congressional Quarterly's Guide to Congress, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 108-
A, 109-A (1991) [hereinafter Guide to Congress].
295. See H.R. 14,856, 93d Cong. (1974).
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to protect the elderly, minorities, and religious groups against
similar discrimination. '
Advocacy of the 1975 HMDA came from Senate Banking Com-
mittee Chair William Proxmire, who sponsored the legisla-
tion. 97 A similar bill was introduced in the House by Repre-
sentative John Joseph Moakley."8 However, these bills were
no more responsive than the enactment, because they were also
disclosure-only bills. '99 The advocacy effort for more. responsive
measures came almost exclusively from community and civil
rights groups.
30 0
Senator Brooke, the only black member of the Senate in 1975,
was the only Republican on the Senate Banking Committee to
vote to approve the Proxmire bill instead of a proposal by Re-
publican Senator Jake Garn (R. Utah) simply to require the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board to study redlining problems in se-
lected cities.30' Just as he had done in connection with the
1968 Fair Housing Act, Senator Brooke was willing to ignore
party positions in order to support measures more protective of
minority interests. In the House, the only advocacy effort for a
more responsive enactment was the proposed amendment by
Andy Jacobs, Jr. to require disclosure by lenders not only of
mortgage loans approved, but also of written loan requests.0 2
In the 1976 amendment to the ECOA, the primary advocate
for more responsive legislation was Representative Sullivan, who
repeatedly criticized the 1974 ECOA and the subsequent House
proposals aimed at strengthening its provisions, and repeatedly
pressed for more responsive amendments.0 3 A secondary advo-
cate might be Representative Frank Annunzio (D. Ill.), who
brought the bill to the floor under a suspension of rules proce-
dure in order to avoid any weakening of the bill via floor amend-
296. See Banking Insurance, Credit Bill Cleared, supra note 197, at 167.
297. See Bowman, supra note 200, at 1040. Senator Proxmire was described as "an
important ally" of community groups targeting redlining. See id.
298. See id. at 1042.
299. See id. at 1040.
300. See id. at 1040-41.
301. See 'Redlining' Disclosure, 33 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1147 (1975).
302. See Congress Clears Redlining' Legislation, supra note 122, at 463.
303. See Equal Credit Opportunity, supra note 207, at 583.
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ments.3s° The bill was further strengthened in the Senate and
in conference, but no particular individual is identified in the
source materials as responsible for these changes.
Senator Proxmire was the source of the 1977 community rein-
vestment initiative. He sponsored an anti-redlining bill, and as
chair of the Senate Banking Committee, caused its provisions to
be included in the proposed amendment to the Community De-
velopment Act."0 5 His proposal was only slightly more respon-
sive than the enacted initiative, containing more reporting re-
quirements."°6 Nonetheless, his initiation of the enactment
demonstrates concern for minority interests. In conference, Sen-
ators Williams and Brooke advocated use of an aid formula that
would benefit older cities.0 7
During the 1974-1977 period, there were two black or Hispan-
ic Senators and nineteen to twenty black or Hispanic members
of the House. Once again, only Senator Brooke demonstrated
advocacy efforts for more responsive legislation. A few black and
Hispanic members spoke in favor of the more responsive legisla-
tion, but only in general terms, not in a way that would distin-
guish their efforts from any other member who voted for pas-
sage.
c. The Second Period of Turbulence: 1988-91
Congress revised the enforcement provisions of the FHA in
1988. Representative Don Edwards again urged enactment of
strong enforcement provisions in the FHA, a measure which the
civil rights community desired.0 ' In the House, Representative
Hamilton Fish, Jr. also played an important role.0 ' He was
304. See id.
305. See Kathryn Waters Gest, Senate Action Slated on Urban Aid Bill, 35 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1121, 1122-23 (1977) [hereinafter Gest, Senate Action Slated];
Kathryn Waters Gest, Senate Extends Urban Aid, Housing Programs, 35 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1193 (1977).
306. See Gest, Senate Action Slated, supra note 305, at 1122.
307. See Kathryn Waters Gest, Compromise Reached on Urban Aid Bill, 33 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 2079 (1977) (naming Senators Williams and Brooke as co-sponsors).
308. See Nadine Cohodas, Fair-Housing Bill Begins Uncertain Journey, 46 CONG. Q.
WRLY. REP. 1082 (1988).
309. See id.
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the sole Republican voting in committee to approve the admin-
istrative law judge procedure that civil rights groups preferred,
rather than a trial procedure."10 His approval was crucial during
the final committee mark-ups."'
In the Senate, the chief sponsor of the legislation was Edward
Kennedy (D. Mass.).3' The only other advocates who played key
roles in forging a compromise were Vice President George
Bush313  and HUD Secretary Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.314  Of
course, their support was merely for the compromise measure,
but it was nevertheless important in making action possible.
The 1989 amendments to the CRA and the HMDA were cham-
pioned by two members of the House, Henry B. Gonzalez (D.
Tex.) and Joseph P. Kennedy II (D. Mass.). Both had sought to
introduce the provisions into the House thrift bailout bill while
it was being considered by the House Banking Committee, but
their proposals were rejected. 15 Kennedy raised the issue
again when the House was considering the bill and was able to
secure a close victory for an amendment adding the provisions to
the final bill adopted by the House. 16 The provisions survived
the House-Senate conference, no doubt due to the continued ef-
310. See id.
311. See Nadine Cohodas, Fish Plays Pivotal but Difficult Judiciary Role, 46 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1160 (1988) (stating that Edwards would not proceed until Fish, the
ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, told him that he was satis-
fied with the bill's major provisions).
312. See Compromise Fair-Housing Bill Is Cleared, 44 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 68, 73
(1988).
313. See id. at 68. Bush urged President Reagan to endorse the bill, which he did,
enabling the vice president to claim credit for enactment of an important civil rights
measure. See id.
314. See id. at 73 (observing that the final compromises in the Senate were settled
during a round of meetings, with most of the negotiations taking place in Secretary
Pierce's conference room).
315. See Cranford, supra note 222, at 1025. Gonzalez was able to obtain committee
approval of an amendment to the bill to "require the Federal Home Loan Banks to
earmark a portion of the loans they make to thrifts to help finance mortgages for
low-income families." See John R. Cranford, Fight To Relax Capital Rules Expected
on House Floor, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1306, 1308 (1989). This provision was con-
tained in the bill finally enacted. See Sweeping Thrift Bailout Bill Cleared, supra
note 224, at 121.
316. See House Votes, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1584 (1989). The vote was 214 to
200, divided as follows: Republicans voted 42 to 127; Democrats split 172 to 73; with
Northern Democrats voting 140 to 29 and Southern Democrats 32 to 44. See id.
1997] 1797
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1729
forts of Banking Committee chair Gonzalez, as well as Commit-
tee member Kennedy.1
17
In 1991, there were two distinct pressures for change, one in-
volving the ECOA and the other involving the CRA. The former
led to the 1991 amendment to the ECOA and had its genesis in
the Senate. In 1990 Senator Dixon (D. Ill.) had sponsored a bill,
reported by the Senate Banking Committee, to further
strengthen the ECOA's enforcement provisions.318 Many of its
provisions found their way into the Senate bank overhaul bill
that Congress took up in 1991.' The Senate counterpart of
that bill, with its fair lending amendments, was championed by
Donald Riegle, Jr. (D. Mich.), chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee. Riegle also fought to retain the bill's consumer pro-
tection provisions, including fair lending, when an amendment
to strike them was raised on the floor. 20
Another pressure point was the CRA. Two contrary move-
ments surfaced, one to scale back the CRA and another to
strengthen it. Representative Joseph P. Kennedy II was the
chief proponent of the latter course of action. In subcommittee,
he obtained an amendment to impose new antiredlining stan-
dards on banks opening branches across state lines or affiliating
with securities firms.32' When the full Committee rejected this
proposal, Kennedy vowed to press the issue on the House
floor. 22 In committee, Kennedy also successfully moved to
strike from the bill a provision that would have exempted more
than half of all banks from the HMDA's reporting require-
ments.3  Finally, on the House floor, Kennedy sponsored an
amendment to force banks to develop minority-lending plans in
cases where data revealed a disparity in their lending patterns,
but this proposal also was rejected.3"
317. See Sweeping Thrift Bailout Bill Cleared, supra note 224, at 127, 130-31. Gon-
zalez placed the entire Banking Committee on the conference. See id..at 131.
318. See S. 3049, 101st Cong. (1990).
319. See S. 543, 102d Cong. (1991); see also John R. Cranford, Banking Law Over-
haul, 49 CoNG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3051, 3065-66 (1991).
320. See Senate Votes, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3489 (1991).
321. See Cranford, supra note 230, at 1649.
322. See id. at 1650-51.
323. See John R. Cranford, Considering the Consumer, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
1733 (1991).
324. See John R. Cranford, Banking Overhaul Losing Ground to Complexity, Contro-
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The House Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
had also accepted a proposal to scale back the CRA.3" Howev-
er, through the efforts of Henry B. Gonzalez, chair of the House
Banking Committee, and led by Maxine Waters (D. Cal.), con-
sumer advocates on the committee brokered a deal to strike all
amendments to the CRA, including both those curtailing its
reach (sponsored by Kanjorski) and those strengthening its pro-
visions (sponsored by Kennedy). 26 The Democratic leadership,
who refused to accept any roll-back in the protections afforded
by the CRA, supported this effort.2
In the 1988-1991 period, there were no black or Hispanic
senators and thirty-one to thirty-six black or Hispanic members
of the House, excluding nonvoting delegates. During this period,
only Henry B. Gonzalez and Maxine Waters emerged as strong
advocates. Other black or Hispanic legislators made many gener-
al statements in support of more responsive proposals, but none
of these general statements qualifies as a strong advocacy effort.
Implications of the evidence regarding advocacy efforts of indi-
vidual members of Congress are discussed in Part Il.C of this
Article. For the moment, the analysis requires one additional
piece of evidence, the last part of the puzzle.
3. Voting Records Generally
This section updates Swain's analysis of voting record ratings
of black members of Congress3" and expands it to include His-
panic members. In her study, Swain analyzed COPE and Lead-
ership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) ratings for the 100th
Congress (1987-1989)." This was the period before the sub-
stantial increase in minority House membership that resulted
versy, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3182, 3185 (1991).
325. See John R. Cranford, House Panel's Overhaul Bill Is a Sweep for White
House, 49 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1355, 1357 (1991). A pair of amendments by Repre-
sentative Kanjorski (D. Pa.) would have had the effect of exempting 92% of banks
from the scope of the CRA. See id. This included an amendment granting a two-year
"safe harbor" to any bank with a "satisfactory" or better CRA rating. See id.
326. See Cranford, supra note 230, at 1650.
327. See id.
328. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
329. See SWAIN, supra note 5, at 14.
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from race-based redistricting. This Article analyzes the same
data for the 103d Congress (1993-1995), the period following the
increase in minority membership.
Two ratings were collected: AFL-CIO ratings3. and LCCR
ratings.3 ' The former measures support for redistributive poli-
cies. The latter measures support for civil rights initiatives. Ta-
ble Five contains the results for all black and Hispanic members
of Congress.
TABLE FIvE
Voting Record Ratings: Black and Hispanic Members of the 103d
Congress
A. Black Members of the House
AFL-CIO Rating LCCR Rating
Name of Member 1993 1994 1993-94
Earl F. Hilliard (AL) 100 100 93
Ronald V. Dellums (CA) 100 100 100
Julian C. Dixon (CA) 100 88 100
Maxine Waters (CA) 100 89 100
Walter R. Tucker HI (CA) 100 89 100
Gary A. Franks (R-CT) 8 38 21
Corrine Brown (FL) 100 78 93
Carrie Meek (FL) 92 78 100
Alcee L. Hastings (FL) 92 88 93
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (GA) 100 56 79
John Lewis (GA) 100 100 100
Cynthia A. McKinney (GA) 100 100 100
Bobby L. Rush (IL) 100 89 100
Mel Reynolds (IL) 92 63 93
Cardiss Collins (IL) 100 89 100
William J. Jefferson (LA) 92 78 100
Cleo Fields (LA) 100 100 93
Albert R. Wynn (MD) 100 89 100
330. The source of the ratings was POITICS IN AMERICA: 1996, 104TH CONGREsS.
331. The source of the ratings was Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, Civil
Rights Voting Record for the 103rd Congress.
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Kweisi Mfume (MD) 100 100 100
John Conyers, Jr. (MI) 100 100 93
Barbara-Rose Collins (MI) 100 100 93
Bennie Thompson (MS) 100 88 92
William L. Clay (MO) 100 100 93
Donald M. Payne (NJ) 100 100 93
Floyd H. Flake (NY) 92 78 100
Edolphus Towns (NY) 100 100 93
Major R. Owens (NY) 100 100 93
Charles B. Rangel (NY) 100 100 86
Eva Clayton (NC) 100 89 100
Melvin Watt (NC) 100 100 100
Louis Stokes (OH) 100 100 100
James E. Clyburn (SC) 100 88 100
Harold E. Ford (TN) 86 88 71
Eddie Bernice Johnson (TX) 92 78 100
Robert C. Scott (VA) 100 89 100
B. Black Members of the Senate
AFL-CIO Rating LCCR Rating
Name of Member 1993 1994 1993-94
Carol Moseley-Braun (IL) 73 75 93
C. Hispanic Members of the House
AFL-CIO Rating LCCR Rating
Name of Member 1993 1994 1993-94
Ed Pastor (AZ) 92 78 100
Xavier Becerra (CA) 92 78 86
Matthew G. Martinez (CA) 100 67 86
Lucille Roybal-Allard (CA) 92 78 100
Esteban E. Torres (CA) 92 75 100
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) 75 67 57
Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL) 83 78 64
Luis V. Gutierrez (IL) 100 100 100
Robert Menendez (NJ) 100 89 100
Bill Richardson (NM) 92 78 86
Nydia M. Velazquez (NY) 100 100 100
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Jose E. Serrano (NY) 100 78 100
E. "Kika" de la Garza (TX) 83 56 57
Henry B. Gonzalez (TX) 100 100 93
Henry Bonilla (R-TX) 0 0 14
Solomon P. Ortiz (TX) 83 56 64
Frank Tejeda (TX) 83 67 79
For black members of the House, Table Five confirms the uni-
formly high ratings found by Swain. Excluding Republican Gary
Franks (R. Conn.), the AFL-CIO voting record ratings average
97.8 for 1993 and 90.7 for 1994, while the LCCR voting record
ratings for the two year period 1993-1994 average 95.6. This
compares with an average score of 99.3 and 90.8 for AFL-CIO
and LCCR ratings respectively, reported by Swain in the 100th
Congress.332 Table Five also reveals that these very high indi-
vidual ratings exist for both Northern and Southern black mem-
bers. Swain found that among Democrats, the disparity between
black members generally, or between black Southern members
and white Southern members, was quite large.333 The 103d
Congress contained many more black Southern members than
the 100th Congress studied by Swain. Table Five demonstrates
the same very high AFL-CIO and LCCR voting record ratings
among black Southern Democrats. Evidence of the large differ-
ence between the LCCR and AFL-CIO voting record ratings of
black Southern Democrats and Southern Democrats in the 103d
Congress is found in Appendix A. The differences in voting re-
cord ratings thus are found not only in a single year or session,
but are found in many years.
Table Five contains similarly high ratings among Hispanic
members of the House, although not as high as those of black
members. Excluding Republican members, the average AFL-CIO
voting record ratings were 93.5 for 1993 and 78.4 for 1994. The
average LCCR ratings were 89.4 for the 1993-1994 period. This
is closer to the average found by Swain for all white Northern
332. See SWAIN, supra note 5, at 234-35 app. C.
333. Swain found that the average AFL-CIO and LCCR voting record ratings for
white Southern Democrats were 80.2 and 72.7, respectively. See id. at 57 tbl.3.3.
There were three black Southern Democrats in Swain's sample, and their AFL-CIO
and LCCR ratings averaged 96.8 and 91, respectively. See id. at 234-35 app. C.
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Democrats in the 100th Congress." Excluding Texas Hispanic
Democrats, the average AFL-CIO voting record ratings of His-
panic members rose to 96.0 in 1993 and 81.8 in 1994, while the
average LCCR rating for 1993-1994 rose to 95.8. Both figures
are higher than the average ratings found by Swain for white
Northern Democrats in the 100th Congress.3 5 The AFL-CIO
and LCCR voting record ratings of Texas Hispanic Democrats
are, on average, about the same as those earlier found by Swain
for white Southern Democrats. 36
Table Five reveals a final indicator of strong legislative heart,
apart from these numerical differences in average ratings. A
substantial number of individual black and Hispanic members
received a rating of 100 for every year in question. The individu-
als with a 100 rating are often the same in each year.
TABLE SIX
Percentage of Democratic Black or Hispanic Members Receiving
a 100 Rating
Voting Record Black Hispanic
Ratings House Members House Members
AFL-CIO - 1993 76.5 42.8
AFL-CIO - 1994 47 21.4
LOCR 1993-94 55.9 50
Similarly, in Swain's analysis of the voting record ratings in
334. In the 100th Congress, the ratings for white members of the House were:
AFL-CIO Rating LCCR Rating
Northern Democrats 92.7% 90.3%
Southern Democrats 80.2 72.7
Northern Republicans 37.5 43.1
Southern Republicans 14.6 13.1
See id. at 57.
335. See id.
336. See id. The AFL-CIO voting record ratings of the Democratic, Hispanic mem-
bers from Texas averaged 87.25 for 1993 and 69.75 for 1994, or 78.5 for the com-
bined 1993-1994 period. Their LCCR voting record ratings averaged 73.25 for the
1993-1994 period. Florida Hispanic members were all Republicans. No Southern state
had a Hispanic Democratic member. See id.
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the 100th Congress, she found that nineteen of twenty-two
(86.4%) black representatives had AFL-CIO ratings of 100.2
She also found that ten of twenty-two (45.4%) black representa-
tives had LCCR ratings of 100.338
What would be the effect of race-based districting that would
further raise the number of minority members? Cameron, Ep-
stein, and O'Halloran have provided one answer to the question
by estimating the expected effect on LCCR scores.139 They con-
cluded:
[I]n states with few districts or few minority voters [the
drawing of district boundaries has] little effect on the repre-
sentation scores of the state's congressional delegation. Ger-
rymanders would make an appreciable difference, however, in
states with a high percentage of black voters, especially in
the South. In Louisiana the difference is 21.3 points, in Mis-
sissippi, 23.3 points, in South Carolina, 19.9 points, and so
on. The overall national effect on LCCR scores, weighing the
swing in each state by its seats in the U.S. House, would be
13.1. We therefore conclude that the representation effects
estimated above are not only statistically significant but also
substantively important in a number of states.34
C. Phase Transitions: Nonlinearity and Critical Mass
Like so much of chaos itself, phase transitions involve a
kind of macroscopic behavior that seems hard to predict by
looking at the microscopic details. When a solid is heated, its
molecules vibrate with the added energy. They push outward
against their bonds and force the substance to expand. The
more heat, the more expansion. Yet at a certain temperature
337. See id. at 234-35 app. C.
338. See id.
339. See Cameron et al., supra note 32, at 808-09 & tbl.7. Their estimates are
based on increasing the number of minority candidates elected to office, by using
districts with the percentage of black voters that they calculate would maximize
election possibilities. See id. at 807. These districts would contain less than 65% mi-
nority populations, but nonetheless would be gerrymandered based on race. See id.
at 807-08.
340. Id. at 808.
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and pressure, the change becomes sudden and discontinu-
ous.... Crystalline form dissolves, and the molecules slide
away from one another. They obey fluid laws that could not
have been inferred from any aspect of the solid. The average
atomic energy has barely changed, but the material-now a
liquid, or a magnet, or a superconductor-has entered a new
realm. "
During 1967-1991, the number of black and Hispanic mem-
bers of Congress increased. The recognizable role of these mem-
bers on the fair lending policy debate changed very little, howev-
er. White members of Congress were primarily responsible for
advocacy of the initiatives enacted, as well as other more respon-
sive initiatives that were the subject of negotiation and debate.
One might conclude that individual white members of Con-
gress demonstrated a strong legislative heart for minority inter-
ests and served those interests as well as black or Hispanic
members. This conclusion would support the Supreme Court's
opinion in Shaw v. Reno, stating that race should not
matter.342 However, two pieces of evidence raised questions
about this conclusion even during the 1967-1991 period, suggest-
ing a greater desire and commitment to serve minority interests
among black and Hispanic members than among even liberal
white members. First, voting record ratings by the AFL-CIO and
by the LCCR were significantly higher for black members, and
voting record ratings by the SWVRI were higher for Hispanic
members than for Congress generally.' " They were also higher
than the voting record ratings of any subcategory, particularly
Southern Democrats, but even including Northern Demo-
crats.3 Second, black and Hispanic members consistently pro-
posed more responsive bills, in numbers disproportionate to
their membership numbers in the Congress. 4 '
After the race-based redistricting following the Supreme
Court's Voting Rights Act decisions and the elections of 1992,
341. GLEICK, supra note 87, at 127.
342. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
343. See supra notes 34-35, 65-66 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
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the number of black and Hispanic members of the House jumped
from thirty-four in 1988-1989 and thirty-six in 1991, to between
fifty-five and fifty-eight in the 1993-1994 and 1995-1996 ses-
sions. 46 What was the result? Did the number of minority
members reach a critical mass that led to a difference in the
impact of black and Hispanic representatives on the legislative
process? I answer this question by completing the analysis of
participants in the fair lending debate during the 1993-1996
period.
1. Critical Mass: Committee Viewpoint
The first effect of achieving a critical mass would be on the
viewpoint and agenda of particular committees affected by the
change. For example, there was a change in the overall philoso-
phy of the House Banking Committee during the 1993 legisla-
tive session.
With a slew of retirements, defeats and defections, and a
freshman class that makes up nearly half its membership,
the House Banking Committee has a new look-and what
promises to be a new agenda less friendly to the nation's fi-
nancial institutions.
The committee has lost a core of moderate Democrats who
were strong allies of the financial services industry. Replac-
ing them are a host of urban Democrats, many of them black
and Hispanic, with sharply different priorities....
The upshot is likely to be a stronger focus on housing, com-
munity development and consumer and small-business credit
issues, with less interest in the traditional priorities of the
banking industry.34
In interviews with new black members of the Committee, the
repeated focus was on more loans for neighborhoods as well as
small and minority-owned businesses. 48
346. See generally Guide to Congress, supra note 294, at 108-A to 109-A; supra
notes 5-6; 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 4 (1993).
347. Andrew Taylor, Freshmen Shift the Balance on House Banking Panel, 51
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 209 (1993).
348. See id. at 209-10.
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Achieving a critical mass is particularly important in the
House. Richard Fenno has documented that policy individualism
is actually reinforced by conditions in the Senate. 9 In the
House, it is less likely to be allowed, either on the floor or in
committee." ° Moreover, individual House members' influence
on chamber decisions occurs almost entirely within commit-
tees. 5' A policy initiative strongly favoring minority interests
that is not supported by the House or by a noticeable portion of
committee members often does not receive attention, being char-
acterized as merely policy individualism. An initiative typically
needs to be favored by at least a sizable number of committee
members in order to receive committee attention, indicating that
a critical mass of support is needed to demand attention. The
size of that critical mass will vary from committee to committee,
and it certainly may include white members who favor more re-
sponsive initiatives than the House may favor generally. A sin-
gle member or even several members, however, will not be suffi-
cient to create that critical mass.
Table Seven charts the size of the House committees that con-
sidered the fair lending legislation discussed in this Article, and
the number of black and Hispanic members in each of these
committees. It also charts the membership trends of such com-
349. See FENNO, supra note 104, at 145-46.
350. See id. at 170.
[Tihe policy individualism of the Senate group surely is the more solidly
reinforced by conditions in its parent chamber. As a strategic premise,
policy individualism is more likely to be adopted by Senate than by
House committees. And where it is adopted by a Senate committee, it
will be that much easier to implement.
Id.
351. See id. at 147-48.
IDecision making inside the Senate is much less of a committee-dominat-
ed process than it is in the House. For where it becomes necessary, as in
the House, to circumscribe the activity of individual members and rely on
fairly inflexible procedures and where the countervailing pressures toward
individualism are of only modest intensity, the tendency to rely on formal
collectivities for decision making is strong. And this tendency, of course,
magnifies the importance of committees. In the House, the individual
member's influence on chamber decisions is exerted, almost wholly, with-
in and through his committees. Senators operate within no such con-
straints.
Id. at 147.
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mittees after the 1992 elections. After these elections, black and
Hispanic membership on the House Banking Committee exceed-
ed twenty percent for the first time.
TABLE SEVEN
Number of Black and Hispanic Members on House Committees
Considering Fair Lending Initiatives
Number of Black
Number of and Hispanic
Year Committee Members Members
1967 Judiciary 35 1
1968 Judiciary 35 1
1974 Banking & Currency 40 4*
1975 Banking, Currency &
Housing 43 3*
1976 Banking, Currency &
Housing 44 3*
1977 Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs 47 4*
1988 Judiciary 34 2
1989 Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs 51 6*
1990 Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs 51 5*
1991 Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs 52 5
1993 Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs 51 11
1994 Banking, Finance &
Urban Affairs 51 11
*. including Walter E. Fauntroy, nonvoting delegate from the District of Columbia
Chaos theory teaches us that effects are nonlinear. 52 An in-
crease in the number of minority members, from three in 1976
to six in 1989, does not translate into a doubling of impact on
committee viewpoint. Similarly, a rise from six members in 1989
352. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
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to eleven members in 1993 does not translate into another dou-
bling of the original level of impact. Not only are effects nonlin-
ear, but at some point a transition phase is passed and the effect
.becomes different in nature. The same would be true in reverse,
as minority members are lost.
2. Critical Mass: Individual Advocacy
Achieving a critical mass would also affect visible advocacy
efforts, which may no longer be characterized as extreme policy
individualism. The post-1992 Congress supplies evidence of this
effect. Analysis of individuals' advocacy efforts protective of mi-
nority interests found far greater participation by black and His-
panic members after 1992 than in all prior periods, even the
1988-1991 period.
The fair lending proposals during 1993-1996 chiefly involved
the CRA. The first session following the 1992 elections in which
fair lending was a serious issue on the legislative agenda was in
1994. First, Congress was considering an interstate bank
branching bill. 53 Consumer groups wanted to include en-
hanced community reinvestment requirements in the bill."54
These groups viewed the House Banking Committee as more
sympathetic to their interests than the Senate Banking Com-
mittee, primarily because of the House Committee's "more liber-
al and urban-oriented membership."355 The consumer move-
ment included proposals to force banks benefiting from inter-
state branching to make specific commitments to grant more
loans in underdeveloped neighborhoods, and to provide basic
banking and check-cashing services. 56 Another proposal would
deny new interstate branching powers to banks that previously
had demonstrated a pattern of closing branches in low- and
moderate-income areas. 57 These proposals were more respon-
sive to minority interests than the bill that eventually was en-
353. See Andrew Taylor, With Major Hurdle Gone, Prospects for Branching Bill
Look Bright, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 425 (1994).
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See Andrew Taylor, What Opponents Seek, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 462 (1994).
357. See id.
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acted. The "pro-consumer fight" was led by Joseph P. Kennedy
(D. Mass.), Kweisi Mfume (D. Md.), and Maxine Waters (D.
Cal.)."' s In addition, Cleo Fields (D. La.) was an active advo-
cate in committee for one of these consumer proposals. 59 For
the first time, a majority of the advocates in Committee (three
out of four) were black members.
A second fair lending proposal on the legislative agenda in
1994 was a bill to combat insurance redlining. Past fair lending
initiatives had targeted banks and mortgage companies. The
1994 initiative targeted insurance companies, and the additional
barrier they posed to equal availability of credit.60 The House
approved a bill in July of 1994 after Representative Lucille
Roybal-Allard (D. Cal.) unsuccessfully attempted to strengthen
the measure through a floor amendment. 6' Two bills had been
reported. 62 One bill was reported by the House Energy and
Commerce Committee, and that bill developed under the guid-
ance of floor manager Cardiss Collins (D. Ill.). A stronger bill
had been reported by the newly constituted House Banking
Committee, with strong support from chairman Henry B. Gonza-
lez and Representative Joseph P. Kennedy II. Three of the
four advocates in the attack against insurance redlining were
Hispanic or black members.
When the interstate banking bill was approved by the House
in August 1994, it was a clean bill, without any additional mea-
sures, including heightened CRA requirements." 5 In the brief
House debate on the measure, several House members criticized
the absence of consumer provisions, including Joseph P. Kenne-
358. See id.
359. See Andrew Taylor, Bill To Allow Interstate Branching Cruises Through House
Panel, 52 CONG: Q. WKLY. REP. 589 (1994) (noting that Fields proposed an amend-
ment to require banks to provide affordable basic banking and check cashing services).
360. See George Hager, House Approves Energy Panel's Bill on Insurance "Redlin-
ing", 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2010 (1994).
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See David S. Cloud, House Approves Interstate, Community Lending Bills, 52
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2230 (1994).
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dy II and Kweisi fumne."'
The conclusion that individual advocacy efforts of black and
Hispanic members had experienced a phase transition does not
mean that such advocacy must be universal or uniform. Of
course, not all black and Hispanic members supported the most
responsive fair lending positions.6 7 Individual variations are
inevitable.
A study of the Congressional Black Caucus after the 1992 re-
districting, conducted by Canon"' reached a similar conclusion
regarding the phase transition experienced in the legislative
voice of individual black members of Congress. Canon concluded
that "the new size of the CBC [Congressional Black Caucus] has
substantially increased its political clout while simultaneously
pushing it into the political mainstream ... .369
The November 1994 elections caused control of the House to
shift to the Republican party. As a result, black and Hispanic
members, who are almost all Democrats, became part of the nu-
merical minority on House committees. The 1995 initiatives pro-
posed to scale back the CRA. No particular House Democrats
were singled-out as leaders in the fight against these measures.
The votes in favor of scaling back the CRA, however, were al-
ways divided along party lines.
366. See id.
367. For example, Representative Floyd H. Flake (D. N.Y.) has advocated strongly
for community development, but has been willing to support concessions on the CRA
as a trade-off for such measures. See Andrew Taylor, Community Lending Proposal
Challenges Clinton Plan, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2029 (1993).
368. See David T. Canon, Redistricting and the Congressional Black Caucus, 23 AM.
POL. Q. 159 (1995).
369. Id. at 160-61. Canon concluded, for example, that the CBC provided the mar-
gin of victory on 9 of the 16 "key votes" identified by Congressional Quarterly in the
first section of the 103d Congress. Id. at 166. This is not itself a measure of legis-
lative voice when advocating minority interests, but it can lead to greater receptive-
ness. Canon's second conclusion was that newly elected African-American members of
Congress were more likely to provide equal protection without special treatment for
any single group. See id. at 161.
370. The House Banking Financial Institutions Subcommittee, by a vote of 13 to 6,
approved a bill granting a "safe harbor" to any bank with a "satisfactory" CRA rat-
ing, with only one Democrat, Bill Orton of Utah, voting with the Republicans. See
Andrew Taylor, Bill Freeing Banks of Numerous Rules Would Be Their Biggest Victo-
ry in Years, 53 CONG. Q. WELY. REP. 1722, 1722-23 (1995). The subcommittee also
approved a bill limiting the Justice Department's ability to enforce fair lending laws,
in an 8 to 5 vote divided along party lines. See id. at 1723.
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Strong policy responsiveness might exist at the individual lev-
el without the Congress as a whole following that lead. In the
long-term, policy responsiveness on the part of Congress as a
whole is desired, even if it takes the form of compromise mea-
sures. However, such responsiveness is not expected on a regu-
lar basis. The legislative process is too complex and unpredict-
able, and the legislative body is changing continually. Elected
officials must demonstrate strong desire and commitment for the
interests of their constituents on a regular, consistent basis.
This legislative voice is a desired end in itself.
IV. CONCLUSION.
In the legislative process, race does matter. Black and Hispan-
ic members of Congress have demonstrated greater legislative
heart-a desire and commitment to minority interests that is
greater in degree than the commitment demonstrated by white
members of Congress. That consistently greater desire and com-
mitment is found in black and Hispanic members' higher voting
record ratings on civil rights and redistributive policy issues. It
is found in their formulation of more responsive legislative pro-
posals, in numbers out of proportion to their membership. When
a point of critical mass is reached, black and Hispanic members'
commitment to minority interests is found in their over-repre-
sentation, among policy advocates, of positions strongly protec-
tive or supportive of minority interests. In sum, minority mem-
bers of Congress demonstrate greater legislative heart, and this
legislative heart becomes a recognizable presence once a critical
mass is reached. As a consequence, when the United States Su-
preme Court asks whether race-based redistricting serves a com-
pelling state interest, there is a need to pause and reconsider
the importance of minority representation.
The House Banking Committee did not support the bill with the Justice De-
partment provision, but did approve the CRA safe harbor provision by a 27 to 23
vote along party lines. See Andrew Taylor, Panel Broadens "Relief' for Banks; Deli-
cate Balance Now Teetering, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1909 (1995). The committee
also approved a bill allowing small banks to self-certify compliance with the CRA, by
a 26 to 20 party-line vote. See Andrew Taylor, Banking Panels Move Toward Dis-
solving Thrift Industry, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2870, 2870-71 (1995).
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APPENDIX
VOTING RECORD RATINGS OF HOUSE SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS*
AFL-CIO Rating LCCR Rating
State/Members 1993 1994 1993-1994
Alabama
Black Member
Hilliard 100 100 93
White Members
Browder 58 78 50
Bevill 92 56 57
Cramer 83 78 57
Florida
Black Members
Brown 100 78 93
Meek 92 78 100
Hastings 92 88 93
White Members
Hutto 25 38 36
Peterson 100 67 64
Thurman 100 89 79
Gibbons 83 63 86
Bacchus 83 67 86
Johnston 92 63 79
Deutsch 100 67 86
Georgia
Black Members
Bishop 100 56 79
Lewis 100 100 100
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McKinney 100 100 100
White Members
Darden 75 67 57
Rowland 42 44 43
Deal 42 33 21
Johnson 58 44 43
Louisiana
Black Members
Jefferson 92 78 100
Fields 100 100 93
White Members
Tauzin 42 33 36
Hayes 50 38 36
Mississippi
Black Member
Thompson 100 88 92
White Members
Whitten 82 75 50
Montgomery 42 50 43
Parker 33 50 50
Taylor 42 56 43
North Carolina
Black Members
Clayton 100 89 100
Watt 100 100 100
White Members
Valentine 30 38 50
Lancaster 67 67 50
Price 92 78 86
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Neal
Rose
Hefner
South Carolina
Black Member
Clyburn
White Members
Derrick
Spratt
Virginia
Black Member
Scott
White Members
Pickett
Sisisky
Payne
Moran
Boucher
Byrne
63
100
89
100
100
* Arkansas is not included because it had
tives in the 103rd Congress.
no black representa-
100
92
83
100
42
75
50
92
100
100
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